Justice Verma Committee:
An extremely important recommendation that echoes the sentiments
of Jammu and Kashmir and the north eastern states, the Justice Verma
Committee has categorically asked for a review of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act and
other related legislations to ensure that military personnel guilty of
crimes against women are unable to take refuge of these laws to escape
punitive action. And instead they should be tried under the criminal
laws of the land. The
depositions before the Committee by persons from conflict areas
convinced it of the need to make armed forces personnel guilty of sexual
crimes against women accountable under the criminal laws of the land.
“Systematic of isolated sexual violence, in the process of Internal
Security duties is being legitimized by the Armed Forces Special Powers
Act, which is in force in large parts of our country,” the Committee
said.
It
is no secret that women in conflict zones have been subjected to sexual
assault by the military, para military and police personnel posted
ostensibly to maintain law and order. Despite brutal gang rapes
the authorities at all levels have ignored calls for free and fair
trials of those involved. This columnist has met any number of women in
the Kashmir Valley who were raped, who are in a position to identify the
rapists in uniform, and yet have had to resign themselves to the trauma
and the complete callousness of the authorities to their plight. The
Committee has suggested the setting up of special commissioners for
women’s safety and security in the conflict areas of the country, with
the commissioners having adequate powers to monitor and initiate action
as well as criminal prosecution.
Unquote:
Justice
Jeevan Reddy had already recommended the scrapping of the undemocratic
and inhuman Armed Forces Special Powers Act in his report.
Now the Justice Verma Committe also has asked for the review of the AFSPA.
But neither Cong nor BJP will touch the AFSPA and other related draconian legislations.
SN
On Thu, Jan 24, 2013 at 1:07 PM, Sankara Narayanan <psn.1946@gmail.com> wrote:
1. This is not Army's internal matter.
2. Why should a crime committed against a civilian be tried by an Army court?
3. Had the victim been the wife/daughter of an army officer, will the Army court award 3 months jail sentence to the culprit?
4. Quote: ''In Jharkhand, the state police have even registered cases against the CRPF personnel."
Is it unlawful to register cases against the CRPF personnel, Mr Prakash Singh?
If the CRPF
personnel commit crimes against the unarmed tribals, does the ex top cop
expect the state police to cover up such crimes?
No wonder Ankit Garg, SP who supervised the inhuman torture perpetrated against Soni Sori was decorated with a gallantry award.
5. This lawless attitude of the law enforcers only alienates
the people from the state and forces them to join ranks/ to be sympathetic with ultras in Central India and border states.
6. Dr B D Sharma (ex - bureaucrat,
while escorting the released Sukma Collector Paul Menon) asked the
tribals what did they gain by supporting the ultras for more than two
decades. Pat came the reply: ''We are rescued from the Patvari and Thanedar Raj''.
Are you listening Mr Prakash Singh and Army Court?
Sankara Narayanan
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I
Armymen Got Lenient Punishment
The New Indian Express. IANS
Guwahati:
After an army persennel was demoted and given three months in jail for
molesting a village woman, Assam CM Tarun Gogoi on Tuesday said that the
Army court had taken a lenient view of the crime.
Gogoi is expected to urge the Defence Ministry to
review the case, to ensure proper justice to the 19 yr-old victim, a
statement from CMO said.
''The Army court has been
insensitive to the seriousness of the crime and has taken a lenient
view. The Army court must have meted out deterent punishment against the
accused,'' the statement said.
An Army court on Monday sentenced Anil Kumar Upadhaya, a
lance naik with 287 Field Regiment, to three months of rigorous
imprisonment in military custody and demoted him to the rank of sepoy.
He was caught attempting to molest a woman in Dolopa village in Sivsagar
dist, in July.
II
Flawed anti-Maoist strategy
By Prakash Singh
18th January 2013 11:37 PM
18th January 2013 11:37 PM
The
recent Latehar incident, in Jharkhand in which nine CRPF jawans were
killed, has come as a jolt to the government. A sense of complacency was
building up on the Maoist front. The home ministry was patting itself
on the back over the sharp fall in the number of violent incidents and
the declining figures of casualties. There had been, till December 15,
only 1,365 incidents of Maoist violence as against 1,683 in the
corresponding period of 2011. Besides, only 409 lives were lost as
against 581 in 2011. The number of security forces personnel who had to
sacrifice their lives in counter-insurgency operations against the
Maoists had also dropped to 113 in 2012 from 141 in 2011. It was claimed
that the security forces’ pressure had started showing results.
Not that the government claims were totally unfounded. It is a fact that the Maoists are on the back foot. Their leadership has suffered considerable attrition. Out of 16 members in the politburo, two have been killed while seven are in custody. Out of the 39-member central committee, five have been liquidated while 13 were arrested. The top leaders accounted for in the recent past include Cherukuri Rajkumar alias Azad, Mallojula Koteswara Rao alias Kishanji and Kobad Ghandy. The loss of important leaders definitely caused setback to the movement. It is also a fact that the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) strength is by and large still in tact. The so-called Operation Green Hunt involving massive deployment of the paramilitary forces in the Maoist-affected areas has been there for nearly three years, but the security forces have not been able to inflict any decisive blow on the Maoists.
The Maoists, on the other hand, have shown that in spite of the reverses they suffered, they retain their lethal punch. The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) patrol was actually trailing the Maoists. On January 7, the Maoists found themselves in a position of advantage. They were on higher ground from where they could watch the movement of the CRPF column. They used the opportunity to open heavy fire, killing five CRPF jawans in the first few minutes of the engagement. The CRPF party regrouped and returned the fire, but the logistical disadvantage weighed against them. The Maoists followed up their successful engagement with acts of savage brutality. A live bomb was placed under the body of one of the critically injured and incapacitated jawans. The two civilians who went to rescue him were blown up along with the jawan. Another jawan’s stomach was slashed and a 2.75 kg improvised explosive devise (IED) was planted inside. The intention possibly was to cause explosion in the hospital where the jawan would be taken and operated upon. Fortunately, the device could be detected timely and defused. A third jawan had his eyes gouged and his tongue slashed. The Maoists’ barbarity was abominable. The party leadership would have a lot of explaining to do. The attitude of the human rights groups would also be worth watching.
It is unfortunate that government has yet no strategic plan to deal with the Maoist problem. In 2006, when Shivraj Patil was Union home minister, government announced a 14-point plan, the salient features of which were: deal sternly with the Naxals indulging in violence; address the problem simultaneously on political, security and development fronts in a holistic manner; accord high priority to distribution of land to landless, development of infrastructure and employment opportunities to the youth, etc. The plan, however, never took off.
The Maoists took full advantage of government’s soft approach to expand their influence across the heartland of the country and strengthen their organisation. The terrorist attack in Mumbai on November 26, 2008 led to Patil’s resignation and installation of Chidambaram as the new Union home minister. Chidambaram was down to earth and he understood the gravity of the problem.
The government’s new response was summarised by Chidambaram, in 2009 in three graphic words: Clear, Hold and Develop. It implied a three-stage strategy. In the first phase, the Naxals would be drained out of their swamps by undertaking well coordinated counter-insurgency operations against them. In the second phase, the civil administration would be established in the areas cleared. In the third phase, economic development would be undertaken on a priority in these regions with emphasis on building roads, hospitals and schools. The Union government deployed central paramilitary forces in the worst affected districts towards the end of 2009 and comprehensive operations were started in early 2010.
The security forces have however not been able to achieve the desired results. This has been due to a combination of factors. The state governments have been lackadaisical in giving the necessary infrastructural support to the paramilitary forces. Besides, the states have been indifferent to building up the capabilities of their own police forces. What is worse, every chief minister is following his own policy in dealing with the Maoists. Police being a state subject, they do not consider the Centre’s directions in the matter mandatory. The chief minister of Bihar is of the view that enforcement action alone would lead to greater alienation of such elements ‘making heroes out of the leaders of the extremist organisations and leading to only symptomatic treatment’. Mamata Banerjee has blown hot and cold in the matter. At one time, she referred to Maoists as ‘friends’, though now her approach is pragmatic. Jharkhand government is so riddled with corruption that it just cannot undertake any effective operations against the Maoists. Maharashtra is not serious about the Maoist problem confined to its Gadchiroli district only.
There is also inadequate coordination between the central and the state forces. This has been noticed in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. In Jharkhand, the state police have even registered cases against the CRPF personnel. Coordination among the states also leaves much to be desired.
There is confusion even in Delhi on the contours of the policy to be followed to tackle the Maoist problem. Chidambaram’s perception and approach were not shared by the ruling party, whose general secretary, Digvijay Singh, openly disapproved of his hard line. The security forces, as a consequence, have generally not been undertaking aggressive operations and are content to just dig in and carry out area domination exercises.
The Government of India must come out with a well-defined strategic plan to deal with the Maoist insurgency. It should also seriously think about placing internal security in the concurrent list of the seventh schedule of the Constitution. That would take care of the existing constraints in dealing with problems that have a pan-India sweep or extend to several states.
Prakash Singh is a retired Police Chief and an expert on Naxal affairs
Not that the government claims were totally unfounded. It is a fact that the Maoists are on the back foot. Their leadership has suffered considerable attrition. Out of 16 members in the politburo, two have been killed while seven are in custody. Out of the 39-member central committee, five have been liquidated while 13 were arrested. The top leaders accounted for in the recent past include Cherukuri Rajkumar alias Azad, Mallojula Koteswara Rao alias Kishanji and Kobad Ghandy. The loss of important leaders definitely caused setback to the movement. It is also a fact that the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) strength is by and large still in tact. The so-called Operation Green Hunt involving massive deployment of the paramilitary forces in the Maoist-affected areas has been there for nearly three years, but the security forces have not been able to inflict any decisive blow on the Maoists.
The Maoists, on the other hand, have shown that in spite of the reverses they suffered, they retain their lethal punch. The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) patrol was actually trailing the Maoists. On January 7, the Maoists found themselves in a position of advantage. They were on higher ground from where they could watch the movement of the CRPF column. They used the opportunity to open heavy fire, killing five CRPF jawans in the first few minutes of the engagement. The CRPF party regrouped and returned the fire, but the logistical disadvantage weighed against them. The Maoists followed up their successful engagement with acts of savage brutality. A live bomb was placed under the body of one of the critically injured and incapacitated jawans. The two civilians who went to rescue him were blown up along with the jawan. Another jawan’s stomach was slashed and a 2.75 kg improvised explosive devise (IED) was planted inside. The intention possibly was to cause explosion in the hospital where the jawan would be taken and operated upon. Fortunately, the device could be detected timely and defused. A third jawan had his eyes gouged and his tongue slashed. The Maoists’ barbarity was abominable. The party leadership would have a lot of explaining to do. The attitude of the human rights groups would also be worth watching.
It is unfortunate that government has yet no strategic plan to deal with the Maoist problem. In 2006, when Shivraj Patil was Union home minister, government announced a 14-point plan, the salient features of which were: deal sternly with the Naxals indulging in violence; address the problem simultaneously on political, security and development fronts in a holistic manner; accord high priority to distribution of land to landless, development of infrastructure and employment opportunities to the youth, etc. The plan, however, never took off.
The Maoists took full advantage of government’s soft approach to expand their influence across the heartland of the country and strengthen their organisation. The terrorist attack in Mumbai on November 26, 2008 led to Patil’s resignation and installation of Chidambaram as the new Union home minister. Chidambaram was down to earth and he understood the gravity of the problem.
The government’s new response was summarised by Chidambaram, in 2009 in three graphic words: Clear, Hold and Develop. It implied a three-stage strategy. In the first phase, the Naxals would be drained out of their swamps by undertaking well coordinated counter-insurgency operations against them. In the second phase, the civil administration would be established in the areas cleared. In the third phase, economic development would be undertaken on a priority in these regions with emphasis on building roads, hospitals and schools. The Union government deployed central paramilitary forces in the worst affected districts towards the end of 2009 and comprehensive operations were started in early 2010.
The security forces have however not been able to achieve the desired results. This has been due to a combination of factors. The state governments have been lackadaisical in giving the necessary infrastructural support to the paramilitary forces. Besides, the states have been indifferent to building up the capabilities of their own police forces. What is worse, every chief minister is following his own policy in dealing with the Maoists. Police being a state subject, they do not consider the Centre’s directions in the matter mandatory. The chief minister of Bihar is of the view that enforcement action alone would lead to greater alienation of such elements ‘making heroes out of the leaders of the extremist organisations and leading to only symptomatic treatment’. Mamata Banerjee has blown hot and cold in the matter. At one time, she referred to Maoists as ‘friends’, though now her approach is pragmatic. Jharkhand government is so riddled with corruption that it just cannot undertake any effective operations against the Maoists. Maharashtra is not serious about the Maoist problem confined to its Gadchiroli district only.
There is also inadequate coordination between the central and the state forces. This has been noticed in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. In Jharkhand, the state police have even registered cases against the CRPF personnel. Coordination among the states also leaves much to be desired.
There is confusion even in Delhi on the contours of the policy to be followed to tackle the Maoist problem. Chidambaram’s perception and approach were not shared by the ruling party, whose general secretary, Digvijay Singh, openly disapproved of his hard line. The security forces, as a consequence, have generally not been undertaking aggressive operations and are content to just dig in and carry out area domination exercises.
The Government of India must come out with a well-defined strategic plan to deal with the Maoist insurgency. It should also seriously think about placing internal security in the concurrent list of the seventh schedule of the Constitution. That would take care of the existing constraints in dealing with problems that have a pan-India sweep or extend to several states.
Prakash Singh is a retired Police Chief and an expert on Naxal affairs
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