Citizens Right to Grievance Redress Draft Bill 2011- Ambiguities galore!
The Draft Bill on Citizens Right to Grievance Redress 2011 though projected by the official think-tank as the one modeled after Right to Information Act 2005, is in fact afflicted with a host of ambiguities, which if not cleared at the moment would render its enactment unfructuous, nay counter-productive at the end of the day. Unlike the RTI Act which has near crystal clarity about most of its provisions and is therefore user-friendly at every level, the proposed draft bill is replete with gaps and confusions, making it vulnerable to abuse and disuse.
Its first and foremost ambiguity is jurisdictional, that is, whether the public authorities of the three organs of our state edifice, executive, legislative and judiciary are covered under its purview or not. At tandem with its preamble which at one sweep embraces ‘every public authority’ within its ambit, the definition of ‘public authority’ given in its Section 2(k) is quite comprehensive too. Going by it, a public authority means “any authority or body or institution of self- government established or constituted, (i) by or under the Constitution; (ii) by any other law made by Parliament; (iii) by any other law made by State Legislature.” Such a stipulation obviously drags all the legislative bodies as Parliament and State Assemblies and entire judiciary from Supreme Court down to the Munsif Court or Court of Judicial Magistrate besides all the administrative bodies of both Centre and States under the Bill’s coverage. Such a comprehensive definition of ‘public authority’ is almost identical to the one mentioned in Section 2(h) of RTI Act. But there is still a big gap between the two. While the RTI Act provides for a clear scheme of implementation, to be undertaken separately by ‘Appropriate government’ meaning the executive organs of both Centre and States, by ‘Competent Authorities’ comprising the presiding authorities of Central and State legislatures and Chief Justices of Supreme Court and High Courts and by President and Governors in relation to certain constitutional bodies, the current draft bill, going by its provisions, limits itself to only ‘Appropriate Government’ aka Central and State Governments under Section 2(b) and has no provision at all for ‘Competent Authorities’ that is legislative and judicial wings of the state or President and Governors. In keeping with the promise of the preamble and comprehensive definition of ‘public authority’, the draft bill therefore needs to incorporate a scheme of ‘Competent authorities’ as aforesaid following the well laid pattern of RTI Act.
The proviso to Section 11(5) of the draft bill requiring the disposal by HoD of ‘an appeal of an urgent or immediate nature’ within the same day or within thirty days at maximum from the date of its receipt sounds no doubt grandiose, just as the proviso to Section 7(1) of RTI Act did by way of promising access to information concerning ‘life or liberty of a person’ within 48 hours of the receipt of the request so made. In a similar vein, the proviso to Section 25(1) and proviso to Section 42(1) mandate the State Public Grievance Redressal Commission and Central Public Grievance Redresal Commission to dispose an appeal of ‘immediate and urgent’ nature within the same day or maximum within 15 days of its receipt. However, in absence of a definition as to what renders an appeal ‘immediate and urgent’ in nature, such provisions are doomed to dysfunction from the inception itself, just as it occurred to the proviso to Section 7(1) of RTI Act in absence of a definition as to what constitutes ‘an information concerning life or liberty’ of a person. Besides, the draft bill shows up its ludicrousness at a more basic level. When there is no provision at all for disposal of a grievance of ‘immediate and urgent’ nature by the GRO vide Section-7 of draft bill, what is the point in keeping such provisions at the level of higher appellate authorities? Moreover, while the State and Central Commissions are not bound by any time-limit for disposing appeals of normal nature, the provision of time-limit for disposal of appeals of ‘immediate and urgent’ nature appears a decorous superfluity only.
The Section 48 of the draft bill providing for ‘Enforcement of orders’ by State Commission or Central Commission is another snag, which needs to be fixed in order to ensure a time-bound disposal of every appeal. It says inter alia that in the event of inability of State or Central Commission in getting any of its orders executed by a public authority, it shall send such order to the local court concerned for the purpose of its enforcement by the latter. Firstly, why should we presume at the moment the reluctance or refusal by a public authority to execute the order of the Commission? The next and more important question arises, there being no time-limit or procedure specified in the draft bill for the concerned local court in respect of disposal of such referred orders and moreover there being no overriding power of the draft bill vis-à-vis the laws in force vide Section 50, where lies the guarantee that the said court shall get the referred order enforced on priority and the aggrieved complainant avail the due and time bound justice against the public servant proved guilty? It may so happen that such a provision shall incentivize the errant public authorities to keep on disobeying the punitive orders of a Commission, because they are cocksure of buying endless abeyance of any decision at the level of concerned courts that may go against them. Above all, Section 48 runs contrary to Section 47 captioned ‘Bar of jurisdiction of court’, which spaciously proclaims that ‘no civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question or to determine any matter’ that falls under the domain of any redressal authority from GRO to the Central Commission.
Based upon six years of experience with RTI Act, it can be safely said that a rights based law in order to succeed in its mission requires the burden of proof in any appeal proceeding to fall on the public servant responsible for denial of the entitlement to the concerned citizen. As a matter of fact, Sections 27 and 40 of the draft bill says that in any appeal proceedings, the burden of proof that the GRO acted diligently shall fall on the GRO himself who denied the request. But, going by the multilevel appellate mechanism mooted in the draft bill, the appeals shall be heard by HoD, State Commission and Central Commission as and where required. It may so happen that an aggrieved complainant may approach State Commission or Central Commission with an appeal against order of the HoD, or he may even approach the Central Commission with an appeal against the order of the State Commission. The question arises, in such appeal proceedings, where the HoD or State Commission shall appear as Respondents, on whom shall fall the burden of proof? In absence of a categorical declaration to the effect that the burden of proof shall ever and always fall on the respondent/ opposite parties in any appeal proceedings, the aggrieved complainant who has already suffered loss due to denial of his entitlement, shall continue to be dragged to the hearings before State or Central Commission at the expense of his time and money.
Correctly enough, the draft bill seeks to redress the complaints of aggrieved citizens occasioned not only by negligence or mala-fide action of the errant public servants, but also by their acts of corruption. The Section 9(1-d) enjoins upon the GRO to locate such cases as where exist prima facie grounds covered under Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 and to recommend to his HoD for penalty to be imposed on the concerned officers. The Section 11 (8) authorizes the HoD to record in writing the evidence of corruption available to him and refer the same ‘to the appropriate authorities competent to take cognizance of such corrupt practice’. In a similar vein, the Section 28 and Section 48 vest the State Commission and Central Commission respectively with the power to refer the cases of corruption to the appropriate authorities for punitive action at the latter’s end. But the flip side of such provisions is horrible too. There is no specification as to the time-limit within which such cases of corruption shall be referred by the GRO to the HoD or by the other appellate bodies to the so-called ‘appropriate authorities’. There is also no specified time-limit within which the HoD or so-called ‘appropriate authorities’ shall take action against the concerned public servants proved guilty of corruption. To cap it all, the draft bill is ominously silent on who are the ‘appropriate authorities’ that shall be called to punish the corrupt officials and what sort of punishment shall be meted out to the latter.
(Chitta Behera, 4A Jubilee Tower, Choudhury Bazar, Cuttack-9, Mobile: 9437577546, Dt 20.11.2011)
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