Abstract
This article provides an in-depth examination and analysis of the 2006–2009 Tuareg rebellion in Mali and Niger. It identifies the underlying reasons behind the rebellion, explores contrasting counter-insurgency (COIN) strategies employed by the two governments, and presents some lessons learned. While both COIN approaches ultimately produced similar peace settlements, the article argues that the Malian strategy of reconciliation combined with the selective use of force was far more effective than the Nigerien iron fist approach at limiting the size and scope of the insurgency and producing a more sustainable peace. It concludes by looking at the role of external actors, particularly the United States, and how the failure to internationalize the conflict was actually more beneficial to the local COIN effort, as well as to the longer strategic interests of the United States in the region.
Introduction
Africa is certainly no stranger to violence, but the latest chapter in an ancient struggle that took place amid the vast, barren and remote reaches of West Africa's trans-Sahara and two of the poorest countries on earth – – Mali and Niger – has largely been overshadowed by contemporary events in Darfur, the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Somalia. Few observers, in fact, took any notice in early 2006 when Tuareg nomads first in Mali and then a year later in Niger took up arms in a revolt against their central governments. And were it not for the opening of a new front in America's war on terror some three years previously in this heretofore neglected part of the continent, it would have largely remained that way. Although domestic factors behind the conflict in Mali and Niger were completely independent and unrelated to the US war on terror in Africa, Washington soon found itself in danger of becoming entangled in the domestic insurgencies of two of its key counter-terrorism allies. The situation was not an easy one for any party, especially given the strategic implications for domestic stability and regional counter-terrorism efforts, but in the end the best path was chosen by all.
The physical and human terrain
The expansive trans-Sahara region sweeps across parts of nine different countries and some 3500 miles from Mauritania and the Western Sahara on Africa's Atlantic coast to Sudan in the east.1
It encompasses nearly three million square miles (Mali and Niger each are twice the size of France) and is home to approximately 120 million people, many of whom eke out a meager existence much as their forefathers did for centuries before. It is a foreboding place of desert sands and rocky escarpments, as well as semi-arid lands and scattered fertile pockets of cultivation. `But by far the most impressive feature of the Sahara are the great massifs – the Adrar des Iforas, the Air, the Tassili and above all, the Ahaggar whose peak, Tahat, rises to 9573 feet. These stand out like islands in a parched sea, relatively well watered and virtually inaccessible. These are the redoubts in which the Tuareg make their homes.'2
Likewise, the political and socio-economic landscape is just as harsh. A colonial legacy of divide and rule that emphasized racial, ethnic, and cultural differences, combined with little economic investment and poorly developed human capital left the newly independent countries of the trans-Sahara impoverished and ill-prepared to cope with the myriad of challenges facing them. Recourse to heavy-handed authoritarian or military rule in the decades immediately following independence did little to assuage the situation and often made the problems worse by alienating key segments of society, aggravating corruption, and increasingly pushing disenfranchised and marginalized elements to resort to violence. Democratic reforms over the past two decades have helped to address some of these issues, but inadequate resources and backsliding on democracy – particularly in Mauritania in 2008 and in Niger in 2009 – has undercut progress. Despite the prospect of untapped mineral wealth improving national economies, a history of corruption, mismanagement, political and socioeconomic inequities, and authoritarian rule has produced some of the poorest countries on earth and the largest recipients of developmental and humanitarian aid. Six of the nine countries in the region currently suffer from huge international debt and four – including Niger and Mali – rank at or in the bottom 5% of the UN's Human Development Index.3
The IMF lists Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). United Nations. Human Development Index. Joining Niger (182 of 182) and Mali (178 of 182) at the bottom of the UN's Human Development Index rankings are Burkina Faso (177 of 182) and Chad (175 of 182). The trans-Sahara is also home to the Berber people known as the Tuareg–`The Blue Men of the Desert' or the Kel Tagelmoust (`The People of the Veil').4 The Tuareg are best known for the practice of men veiling their faces using a cloth dyed with indigo, which would often rub off on their skin and thus early accounts labeled them the `The Blue Men' of the Sahara Desert.
These tall desert nomads and warriors, whose name means `abandoned of God', have called the central Sahara their home since the thirteenth century and are a fiercely independent and proud people. Raiding towns and farming villages and leveling `taxes' on commerce transiting their territory was a way of life that earned them an infamous reputation as thugs and thieves; `the scorpion and the Tuareg are the only enemies you meet in the desert', according to a Arab saying.5
Others, mainly European travelers and explorers, have painted a more romantic view of the Tuareg as the last of a truly free people to whom the desert was their domain and outsiders intruders. Either way, those who have sought to impose their will over the Tuareg have often lived (or sometimes not) to regret their decision; after 30 years and the loss of countless lives in pacifying the Tuareg, the French government in 1910 was spending 3 million francs per year to administer the Algerian Sahara while receiving only one-tenth the amount back in annual taxes.6
Historically Tuareg society was a complex one with a highly stratified social structure of nobles and vassals, organized into many autonomous but related `drum groups' where familial ties and personal loyalty were highly valued. A central chieftain was elected by the various drum groups to preside over a loose geographic confederation; `his role was in fact more like that of a lord chief justice, an adjudicator of disputes among the people of the drum groups' because the Tuareg `were far too independent to allow themselves to be ruled'.7
Today the estimated 1.5–1.7 million Tuareg are spread across an area from southeastern Algeria to the northern reaches of Burkina Faso in the south and from the southwestern Libyan Desert across Niger and Mali into Mauritania in the west, but the majority of Tuaregs (more than two-thirds) are found in Mali and Niger (see Figure 1).8
8. Best population estimates of the breakdown are as follows: Algeria – Kel Ahaggar (65,000); Libya – Kel Ajjer (21,000); Burkina Faso – Kel Oudalan (37,000); Niger – Kel Air and Kel Azawagh (720,000); Mali – Kel Adagh, Kel Tadamakat and Kel Azawagh (534,000); Mauritania, Senegal and northern Nigeria (40,000) (The Peoples of the World Foundation, `Indigenous Peoples'; Krings, `Marginalization and Revolt', 57).
This post-colonial fragmentation has reduced the Tuareg to minority status in every country – no more than 10% of the population at most – and they are often viewed with suspect loyalties, which in turn have fueled Tuareg claims of discrimination and economic neglect at the hands of their respective governments.
Sadly, terrorism has been a defining feature of the region too. The violent and bloody Algerian civil war in the 1990s, gave rise to several terrorist and criminal groups that now operate across the region. One of these groups, the Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat or GSPC as it is known by its French acronym) broke with the main Algerian Islamist leadership in 1998 to align itself with al Qaeda and the wider international jihadist movement.9
On 11 September 2006, al Qaeda's Ayman al-Zawahiri publicly announced his organization's merger with the GSPC and its new name: al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); `Osama Bin Laden has told me to announce to Muslims that the GSPC has joined al-Qaeda' and `we pray to God that our brothers from the GSPC succeed in causing harm to the top members of the crusader coalition, and particularly their leader, the vicious America.'10
The leadership of AQIM in return pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden. Since that time AQIM has embarked upon a deadly campaign of bombings across North Africa, ambushes of military and police personnel, kidnappings, and attacks on foreigners across Algeria and its neighboring countries that has left dozens killed and scores wounded.
Roots of the conflict
Since independence from France in the 1960s, both Mali and Niger have struggled to overcome longstanding historical, political, cultural, and socioeconomic divisions within their societies. For the past 50 years the Tuareg communities of Mali and Niger have found themselves inextricably caught up in this search for national identity and inclusion, as well as in repeated revolts against central authority (Mali 1962–1964 and 1990–1995; Niger 1990–1995). Alternating government strategies of retribution and reconciliation over the years have produced some respite, but never yielded a permanent solution because many of the grievances that sparked past rebellions were never effectively resolved.
Over the years Tuareg grievances have tended to center around three main issues:
Marginalization and discrimination
As distinct racial and cultural minorities, the Tuareg in Mali and Niger have often–consciously and unconsciously – been neglected by their central governments, which are dominated by black southerners. And racial discrimination has been a fact of life; Tuaregs are `animals, murderers. The only solution is to kill them.'11
Thus, a key demand in every peace agreement has been improved Tuareg representation in the government and military. While significant progress has been made over the years on this issue (most notably in the militaries), many Tuareg still feel much more needs to be done.
Exploitative development policies
The remote northern regions of Mali and Niger that the Tuaregs call home, have historically received little in the way of national development assistance and employment opportunities. Part of the problem is purely demographic (these are relatively sparely populated areas) and the other an overall scarcity of government resources. This issue is further compounded in Niger where income from the uranium mines in the Tuareg north now accounts for 72% of Nigerien export income with a potential six-fold revenue increase expected over the coming decade.12
Not only do the Tuareg feel that they are not getting their fair share of this income, but often reckless mining practices threaten the delicate ecosystem that supports the traditional livelihood of thousands of Tuareg nomads.
Greater regional autonomy and demilitarization
Although the politics of decolonization in the 1950s shattered any hope for the creation of an independent Tuareg homeland, the search for greater self-rule and protection of the Tamasheq language and Tuareg culture continues to resonant strongly in both Mali and Niger.
From a more practical perspective, increased localized control and a reduced army presence in the Kidel Region of Mali and in Niger's Agadez Region would facilitate the smooth functioning of the informal – and often illicit – transnational commerce on which the Tuareg have become increasingly dependent. It would also give the Tuareg a greater political say in their region's natural resource development.
While all the above factors have been present in varying degrees over the course of the past five decades, it was a convergence of seemingly unrelated localized events that spun out of control, first in Mali in 2006 and then in early 2007 in neighboring Niger. The new rebellions came as particularly bad news to many of those in Mali who saw the 1995 peace accords as laying the groundwork for lasting peace and reconciliation. One senior army officer observed in 1998 that, `This is one case in which ethnic [sic – racial] trauma appears to have been solved by a government willing to deal simultaneously with the root causes as well as the symptoms of conflict, and a case in which leaders on both sides of a difficult divide have shown vision and political courage.'13
The Tuareg rebel – again
Trouble that had been brewing in Mali between the government and its Tuareg minority for several years finally boiled over in March 2006 with the desertion of about 60 former Tuareg rebels from the Malian army.14 As part of the peace agreement ending the Second Tuareg Rebellion in 1995, 1810 rebels were integrated into the Malian army and another 420 into the police and civil service.
The deserters, under the leadership of former Lt. Col. Hassan ag Fagaga, began launching a series of attacks in May on government outposts in the northeast of the country to seize arms and supplies. Soon afterward the rebels established themselves in the old Tuareg strongholds high in the Tigharghar Mountains of the Kidal Region, not far from the Algerian border. Rather than unleash the army on the Tuareg malcontents, the government of President Amadou Toumani Toure, drawing on lessons from the Second Tuareg Rebellion in the 1990s, sought to reach a peaceful settlement to the crisis; `I am a soldier of peace. My role is not to pour oil on the fire.'15
This non-confrontational stance and an Algerian-broker agreement, addressing Tuareg concerns about the lack of local empowerment and economic development, produced a peace deal in July with the Mai 23, 2006 Alliance democratique pour le changement (Democratic Alliance for Change or ADC) signing in February 2007. The revolt was over, the disarmament process underway, and a volatile situation had been defused. Or so it seemed.
As things appeared to be cooling down in Mali, the focus shifted to neighboring Niger where conflict had ignited on 8 February 2007 when a small group of Nigerien Tuareg attacked a government position near the traditional Tuareg stronghold of Iferouane, which lies on the western edge of the Air Mountains in the far north of the country. A heretofore unknown group, the Mouvement des Nigerien pour la Justice (Niger Movement for Justice or MNJ in French) claimed responsibility for the attack. The MNJ claimed its action was the result of the Nigerien government's inability to address longstanding Tuareg political and economic grievances. According to a MNJ spokesman, `The movement was created because nothing has been done by the government. There is no work, no schools, not even drinking water in all Niger. It's terrible, it's a genocide, and the government is corrupt…'16
The next several months witnessed a series of sporadic MNJ attacks on towns and government garrisons in and around the Air massif – whose peaks rise to some 6000 feet17 The whole of the Air plateau measures nearly 300 miles long from north to south and 150 miles wide `as it rises like an island from the surrounding desert.' `The valleys are green with fan palms, acacias and scattered palms…there are gardens of wheat, onions and tomatoes [that are] irrigated from permanent wells.'
– to the north of the regional capital of Agadez. The rebels also began laying anti-vehicle land mines in an effort to interdict road traffic between key towns and attacked a power plant serving the uranium mining town of Arlit in April. An up tick in rebel activity in June and July resulted in the deaths of 15 soldiers and the capture another 70 after the MNJ overran a government outpost northeast of Iferouane.18
And in a daring twilight raid, about two dozen Tuareg rebels attacked the Agadez airport, which did little real damage but inflicted a psychological blow on the government. Likewise, foreign workers in the uranium mining industry were targeted by the rebels with a Chinese company official being kidnaped, but later released. This increasing insecurity led to the periodic halting of mining activity, as well as the suspension of some humanitarian aid deliveries in late 2007.19
The Nigerien government reacted to this `increased banditry', as it was officially characterized, by rushing 4000 troops to the north in July 2007 and the governor banned all travel except by military convoy in the affected areas and imposed a dusk to dawn curfew on the regional capital.20 Earlier in May the government redirected $60 million to support military operations in the north.21
In contrast the government spent $42 million on food assistance in all of 2006, but a government spokesman justified the $60 million military expenditure by saying that `security [in the north] is one of our main priorities'.
As conditions continued to deteriorate, however, President Mamadou Tandja declared a state of emergency for the Agadez Region on 24 August. Using its emergency powers the government reportedly made dozens of arrests and detentions, as well as instituted a press blackout on reporting of the escalating violence. In an apparent effort to undercut popular support for the rebels, the army forcefully relocated to areas south of Agadez about 80% – up to 4000 people – of the population of Iferouane.22
Meanwhile back in Mali, the rebellion once again was heating up. A splinter group of Tuareg fighters under the leadership of Ibrahim ag Bahanga, a former Malian army officer and rebel commander from the 1990s revolt, began launching attacks in May 2007 on isolated government positions, attacking supply convoys, kidnaping soldiers, and mining roads to the north of the regional capital of Kidal. Ag Bahanga formally broke in August with the main ADC leadership – which had disowned him – to form the Alliance-Touareg-Niger-Mali (ATNM) and claimed to have formed an alliance with his Tuareg brethren in Niger.23
By September the renewed fighting had left dozens killed or injured (mainly as a result of land mine explosions), at least 35 government soldiers held captive, and ATNM rebels besieging the remote army outpost of Tin-Zawatine on the Mali-Algeria border. It was during this siege that the only reported incidence of American military involvement took place when a US Air Force C-130 transport aircraft (in the country supporting a training mission) air dropped some 14,000 pounds of food to the beleaguered garrison at the request of the Malian government. In the course of the operation the C-130 was hit by small arms fire from the rebels and received minor damage.24
According to a US Air Force spokesman, `the plane was the only U.S. aircraft in the country…' and `had responded to a rare one-time request for help from the government.'
Despite their relatively small numbers – the MNJ claimed that defections from the army had swollen its ranks to over 2000 fighters
and active Malian rebels probably numbered well under 1000 – the Tuareg revolts in Mali and Niger appeared to be gaining momentum at the end of 2007 and several regional experts, such as Jeremy Keenan, began warning of an increasingly explosive situation with `the threat of a wider almost trans-Saharan conflagration of the rebellion.'26
No end in sight
Both in Mali and Niger a pattern of low intensity warfare quickly developed. Tuareg fighters would lay siege to isolated government outposts, lay mines and ambush military convoys, launch periodic armed raids, and seize hostages before returning to their mountain hideouts. Government forces would respond to these incidents by attempting to hunt down the marauding bands and seize rebel supply caches. Just as in Mali, several clashes between Nigerien rebels and army troops toward the end of year resulted in civilian deaths with each side blaming the other. Likewise, the widespread use of anti-vehicle land mines by both Malian and Nigerien rebels increased the potential for civilian casualties.27 In 2007 and 2008, land mine explosions in Niger were responsible for killing 46 people and injuring another 139 people.
Their first use in November and December 2007 far southwest of the MNJ's normal operational area raised the specter of a wider bombing campaign aimed at the more populous parts of Niger,28
but these fears failed to materialize. Humanitarian organizations, however, were claiming that by the end of 2007, at least 11,000 people had been displaced as a result of insecurity in Niger's Agadez Region and critically needed food aid deliveries suspended.29
The year ended with neither the governments nor the Tuareg rebels gaining the upper hand.
The start of 2008 saw a geographic and political widening of the Nigerien conflict. In January MNJ fighters killed several policemen and soldiers and took nearly a dozen hostages, including a senior government official, following an attack on a town nearly 200 miles southeast of Agadez. The rebels also claimed to have been joined by many ethnic Toubous veterans from southeastern Niger who rose up against the government in the 1990s. This, along with claimed defections of Hausa officers from the army and support from southern Fulani nomads, increased the rebel strength to 3000–3500 and indicated a broadening of support for the rebellion, according to the MNJ.30
Despite this apparent momentum, the rebels were unable to sustain the pace and scope of their operations outside the Air Mountains and by May government forces seized the initiative and went on the offensive in an attempt to impose a military solution.
By contrast in neighboring Mali, the Toure government sought to complement its use of military force with diplomacy by seeking political accommodation with moderate Tuareg elements, many of whom were displeased with the often indiscriminate violence of some rebel factions. Despite a flare up of military activity in March 2008, including a deadly attack by ag Bahanga's ATNM forces on a convoy north of Kidal, a Libyan-negotiated cease-fire and prisoner exchange was reached in April.31
Unfortunately, the respite was short lived as each side accused the other failing to honor the agreement and significant fighting resume in mountains north of Kidal during May and into July of 2008.
The last half of the year in Niger saw a series of significant clashes between the rebels and army in and around the Air Mountains with each side claiming to have inflicted severe losses on the other.
The rebels continued to mine roads, mount ambushes against government convoys, launch sporadic raids, and seize hostages. The army for its part launched both ground and air assaults on suspected MNJ bases, while seeking to recapture previously lost positions and encircle the rebel's mountain stronghold. November witnessed some of the heaviest fighting – and resultant civilian deaths – as government forces sought to establish inroads into the mountains north of Agadez. Heavy-handed clearing operations against Tuareg villages lead the MNJ to level charges of `ethnic genocide' and Amnesty International condemned the Tandja regime for serious human rights abuses, including the extra-judicial executions of Tuareg civilians by the army.32 `At least 16 civilians were reportedly extrajudicially executed by the army and two journalists, both prisoners of conscience, were arrested for their alleged links with the Tuareg armed movement.' The year 2008 ended on much the same note as 2007 with rebel activity hindering, but not stopping, uranium mining and with the Nigerien army unsuccessful in its efforts to militarily crush the rebels. The Agadez Region remained under a state of emergency.
Momentum for peace
While on the surface neither Bamako's `talk and thump' strategy of combining selective military force with political accommodation or Niamey's `iron fist' strategy of imposing a military solution appeared any closer to resolving their respective Tuareg problems, pressure was steadily building on all parties that would finally prove decisive in bringing peace to both countries.
In Mali behind the scene Algerian-mediated talks between the government and the ADC, which comprised the bulk of the rebels, produced yet another cease-fire in July 2008.33
The lone holdout was ag Bahanga's increasingly hardline ATNM faction, which refused to take part in the talks. In an apparent effort to undercut the cease-fire, the ATNM sought to widen the conflict by launching a series of raids and land mine attacks far outside the Kidel Region. A particularly deadly attack took place on 20 December when ag Bahanga's forces assaulted an army position near the Mauritania border leaving up to 20 soldiers dead and fleeing with several hostages.34
The government's response was to launch an all out offensive against ag Bahanga. On 20 January 2009 government forces destroyed the ATNM main base in the mountains near the Algerian border. The army claimed to have killed some 30 rebels and captured 22 more, as well as large quantities of food and war material.35 Although ag Bahanga remained defiant in the face of this defeat: `Our position is clear: the only alternative we have is reprisal and armed warfare;'36
the end was near. His forces shattered, denounced by his fellow Tuareg commanders, with little popular support, and hard pressed by the Malian army, he and the remnants of his forces fled into Algeria and then eventually to Libya. By February, press reports indicated that hundreds of Tuareg fighters were surrendering their arms and peace talks between the ADC leadership and the government were in their final stages.37
Peace had apparently finally come to Mali's troubled north.
In Niger a series of political and economic developments were also quietly pushing Tuareg rebels and the government toward negotiations. Suppressed personal jealousies, political rivalries, and differing war strategies among competing Tuareg factions finally came to a head in early 2009 when many prominent MNJ commanders and their European supporters broke with the main MNJ leadership and announced the formation of the Front Patriotique Nigerien (Nigerien Patriotic Front or FPN) in March.38
This splintering of the MNJ (combined with other smaller defections in 2008 The surrender of MNJ's Toubou commander, Bocar Mohamed Sougouma, to the government and the creation in May 2008 of the Front of Forces for Rectification (FFR) under the 1990s Tuareg leaders, Rhissa ag Boula and Mohamed Aoutchiki Kriska, reflected early signs of divisions among the Nigerien Tuareg.
) energized various competing Tuareg factions to enter into talks with the government or face being marginalized in the peace process. Despite having vowed never to negotiate with `bandits' and `drug traffickers', President Tandja found himself under growing diplomatic pressure from Mummar Qaddafi, the African Union Chairman and long time Tuareg supporter, to reach a peaceful settlement with the rebels. Likewise, international economic interests in Niger's increasingly lucrative uranium and hydrocarbon sector were pushing for a resolution of the crisis.40One local analyst believed that Tandja's about-face on negotiations with the rebels was directly tied to `the economic and financial stakes' linked to future foreign development of the country's uranium mining sector. See The New York Times, `Battle in a Poor Land for Riches Beneath the Soil' for a look at the international economic dimensions of the conflict.
The French, as point of fact, had already committed themselves to investing $1.5 billion and the opening, of what would be the world's second largest uranium mine at Imouraren by 2012.41
The Tandja government was also deeply involved in negotiations over the proposed $12 billion, 2700 mile-long Trans-Sahara gas pipeline that would bring natural gas from Nigeria to Algeria by transiting Nigerien territory.42 A memorandum of understanding between Nigeria, Niger, and Algeria was later signed in August 2009; construction of the Nigerien section was estimated to cosft between $400–500 million.
Libyan-brokered talks between the government and the three major Nigerien Tuareg rebel groups began in earnest in April 2009 with all sides agreeing to seek a peaceful end to the conflict; `all those taking part in this mission now have the historic responsibility to overcome their differences and realise these commitments, which must now be transformed into a formal peace agreement', announced an FPN spokesman.43
By May significant progress had been made to have President Tandja meet personally with representatives from the three rebel groups at Agadez and promise amnesty to disarming Tuareg fighters. `For a long time we have asked them to put down their weapons and come build the country with us. We forgive them because we want peace in Niger,' said the Nigerien President.44
After fits and starts, the Libya talks yielded a final peace accord on 6 October 2009 whereby both Nigerien and the remaining Malian rebels under ag Bahanga would cease fighting and move toward a peaceful resolution of their differences. Proclaimed Qaddafi in announcing the accord, `It is an historic day and momentous hour as our Tuareg brothers in Mali and Niger have decided to make peace and lay down their weapons.'45
Although modalities for addressing Tuareg grievances had yet to be finalized, the bulk of the remaining 2000 or so Nigerien Tuareg fighters were disarmed and amnestied by November and Niamey lifted the more than two year old state of emergency in the Agadez Region. By the end of the year the few last remaining rebel holdouts finally came to terms with the government and surrender their weapons too.46
46. Independent Online, `Niger Defies Critics'. View all notes
Peace had at long last come to Niger.
After three and a half years of on again, off again fighting the guns had fallen silent in both Mali and Niger. By African standards the 2006–2009 Tuareg rebellion barely registered on conflict-ridden continent: Less than 10,000 government troops fighting about 4000 rebels that resulted in well under 1000 total military and civilian casualties. The fighting also internally displaced about 12,500 people (nowhere near the 150,000 refugees that the 1990's rebellions had generated) and disrupted economic activity and development efforts in two of the poorest countries in the world.47
47. The breakdown is as follows: In Niger some 300 Tuareg fighters and 80 government soldiers were believed to killed, as well as several hundred – the majority civilians – killed or seriously maimed by land mines. The fighting had also displaced 11,000 people, damaged the country's limited infrastructure in the north, and disrupted Niger's critical mining and tourism sectors. In Mali the death toll was much lower with an estimated 50 or so government soldiers killed and an unknown number of rebels dead (probably no more than 100). Several dozen civilians also were killed or injured in land mine explosions and some 1500 people fled the fighting in the north.
Lessons learned
While admittedly the Third Tuareg Rebellion was but a minor blip on a continent struggling to overcome endemic violent conflict, several highly relevant political-military lessons – for both Africans and non-Africans alike – can be gleaned from the rebellion.
First and foremost, festering socio-economic problems provided terribly effective tinder for fueling armed conflict despite the best efforts of governments to defuse them and once ignited the violence can rapidly escalate. Longstanding Tuareg grievances and feelings of alienation were the underlying catalysts that feed the rebellions in Mali and Niger, despite both governments awareness of the danger. The rebellion in Mali, however, assuredly came as a bitter disappointment to those supporters of a reconciliation and integration strategy to addressing their Tuareg problem – an approach that had after all produced 10 years of relative peace and stability. Thus, despite pursuing radically different approaches (conciliation vs. coercion) to defusing the threat, neither government was able to preempt an armed insurrection. This does not mean that both pre-conflict approaches produced the same result. Mali's Tuareg revolt was much more limited in scope, short-lived and quickly resolved, whereas Niger had to face a much larger and full-blown rebellion that proved more challenging to end.
A corollary finding is that domestic problems in Africa rarely remain so, but can quickly become regionalized and caught up in wider regional politics and external objectives. This in turn makes the prosecution and resolution of such `domestic' conflicts increasingly challenging as the complexity of the conflict and the number of associated actors involved grows. This is especially true when powerful transnational or regional linkages, such as common cultural, ethnic or racial identities are involved, or when governments seek to make use of dissident elements in neighboring countries to advance their own foreign policy and security agendas. The old Arab saying that `the enemy of my enemy is my friend' is particularly relevant in these situations. Thus, without some regional solution to these `domestic' conflicts, prospects for any sustainable peace are fleeting.
Although success on the battlefield (particularly in the Malian instance) was important in pushing the insurgents into negotiations, the ultimate counter-insurgency solution was, not surprisingly, a political one. Using selective military force to achieve a political settlement has long been one of the foundational elements of modern-day counter-insurgency strategy, but in the face of an active insurgency it is one that can also be easily compromised. Political solutions take time. Negotiations are usually long and drawn out affairs peppered with multiple setbacks along the path to a final settlement, while military force offers the illusion of a quick and decisive end to the conflict. Thus, the tendency to opt for the appealing military fix is thus difficult for governments to avoid. This was certainly the case in Niger, where the Tandja government place heavy emphasis on the military side of the equation and its iron fist strategy to quell the rebellion, but ultimately had to rely on negotiations to bring about a final settlement. In sharp contrast, the Toure government in Mali never lost sight of the need to temper its military response by making it subservient to the long-term political objective of achieving a negotiated settlement. This was especially remarkable given the sense of betrayal after pursuing years of reconciliation and the forces advocating an iron fist response could have easily won the day. Moreover, in the Malian case the well-calculated military response kept the vast majority of the Tuareg community from going over to the rebels and helped to later fragment the insurgent cause.
Finally, the role (or non-role) of external actors – as in many insurgencies – was critical in determining not only the course and direction of the rebellion, but was also essential to bringing about an end to the conflict. The contrasting roles of the United States and Libya during the rebellion, moreover, highlight several important counter-insurgency lessons that bear remembering.
For the United States
External involvement is normally viewed from the perspective of assistance to the insurgents or the government, but few observers rarely weigh the impact of non-involvement by a key actor on the conflict and its ultimate outcome. The failure of the United States to become involved in the counter-insurgency effort when all signs were pointing toward American intervention in 2006–2007 was a significant positive milestone, because it avoided needlessly globalizing and escalating the conflict by tying it to America's war on terror. This was all the more surprising given the growing US perception since 2002 of the trans-Sahara as becoming a developing security threat; `the traditional caravan routes in this region now serve as conduits for illegal migration and drugs and arms trafficking, as well as a hideout and staging areas for international and regional terrorists and criminals'.48
Under the US Department of State's direction, Washington initially initiated the $7.75 million Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) in November 2002 to assist Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad in improving their border security and counter-terrorism capabilities. The initial focus was on increasing information sharing and the training and equipping of 150-man rapid reaction companies in each of the four PSI countries.
The United States expanded its engagement with the creation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) in 2005 by enlarging the PSI program to cover five additional countries – Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia – and increased funding to $100 million per year for five years. The program has since been renamed the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and Burkina Faso was added in 2009.
At the time of the first stirring of unrest among the Malian Tuareg in the spring of 2006, President Toure's government was a staunch and critical regional ally of the United States in the war on terror. Moreover, Mali and Niger, which together accounted for 30% of all TSCTI spending
From October 2005 to October 2008 Niger received $37 million and Mali $31 million of the $229 million spent or obligated by the Department of State, US Agency for International Development, and the Department of Defense under the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative/Partnership. View all notes
were at what Washington clearly perceived to be the epicenter of its war on terror in the trans-Sahara. `By cooperating with Mali to better protect its borders and territory, we can help keep it from being used by terrorists. This makes Mali a very important partner in the war on terrorism,' according to the US Embassy in Bamako.
Maintaining the support of the regimes in Mali and Niger would certainly be essential to the success of American counter-terrorism efforts in the region. Thus, it may come as somewhat of a surprise that the United States carefully eschewed involvement in the Malian and Nigerien rebellions. What is even more surprising is that both Bamako and Niamey wanted it this way, although for far different reasons.
Several factors appear to account for this unexpected convergence:
1.
Despite the rebellion's unpleasant reminder that Mali had not completely resolved its Tuareg problem, the Toure government undoubtedly felt confident in its ability to address the situation on its own. Past experience had shown that a negotiated settlement was possible – if not the ultimate outcome – and that talks between the government and the rebels were more likely to resolve the crisis than through force of arms alone.
2.
Relatively speaking, the Mali rebellion also involved only a small number – 800 to 1000 – of disgruntled Tuaregs and was generally confined to the far northeast of the country. In addition, the rebels lacked any significant degree of popular support within the larger Tuareg community and many of their subsequent actions further isolated them. Moreover, the vast majority of Tuaregs brought into the government and military after 1995, in fact, remained loyal to the regime throughout the rebellion and some of the most effective Malian army units were lead by Tuareg officers. For example, the government offensive that finally overran the ATNM bases in January 2009 and put ag Bahanga to flight was reportedly led in part by Col. Elhadj Gamou, a Tuareg, from the north.
3.
In Niger President Tandja, who was bent on seeking a military solution, undoubtedly worried that seeking US assistance would be seen as a sign of weakness to both his political opposition and the rebels. He also probably calculated that any American security assistance would come with significant strings attached, especially in the areas of human rights and democratic reform. Thus, this kind of help he didn't need and it would be far too politically costly to his regime.
4.
The Nigerien regime also had to be concerned about possible negative international and regional reaction to bringing the Americans into the conflict. Continued French and Chinese investment in, and development of, the country's uranium mining sector was critical to the Nigerien economy. Greater US involvement in the country could jeopardize these carefully cultivated economic and political relationships. Moreover, President Tandja almost certainly did not want to be seen as weak in the face of the `banditry' in the north and thereby undermine his bargaining position with international mining companies by leaning on the Americans for military help. Qaddafi was also a wild card; Libya had played a key role in arming and supporting Tuareg rebels in the past and US military involvement on Libya's doorstep might just inflame the situation again.
5.
While undoubtedly some elements within the US government would have liked to increase the American military footprint in the region by opportunistically assisting Mali and Niger in their counterinsurgency efforts, the strain of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, US European Command's pre-occupation with a resurgent Russia, and the pending stand up of the new US Africa Command made this all but impossible. State Department officials worried over the potential repercussions in Africa and the Middle East of increased American involvement also appeared to have advocated a hands-off approach. The strongest argument against greater US military engagement with Mali and Niger, however, was the complete lack of a terror convergence between Islamist extremists – such as AQIM – and the Tuareg rebels. In fact, the two were bitter foes, having clashed numerous times prior to the rebellions (and would fight each other during the course of this conflict too)
In October 2006, GSPC/AQIM fighters responded to the killing of one of their deputy commanders in September by launching a revenge attack on Tuareg rebels north of Kidal that left nine rebels dead. In response, an ADC spokesman declared war on the GSPC/AQIM; `we are obligated to attack them' and `we can't negotiate with them… all that is over… we are at war'.
Thus, there was little benefit, but enormous risk to the United States should it seek a greater role in helping Mali and Niger suppress their rebellions.
The end result was that the United States and its war on terror were kept at arms length. It avoided the strategic risks of becoming entangled in Mali's and Niger's internal affairs and both Bamako and Niamey went on to successfully resolve their Tuareg problems. Everyone appeared to come out a winner.
For regional actors
The other key external actor was Libya, which heretofore had been largely seen as a destabilizing force in the region given its active support to Tuareg rebels in the past in terms of arms and sanctuary. For both African and international consumption, President Gadhafi saw it in his interest as African Union Chairman to act as a peace intermediary this time round and he was able successfully to leverage his position with the rebels to force them into accepting a negotiated settlement. Thus Gadhafi not only burnished his credentials as an African peacemaker, but he successfully kept the United States and France from gaining a larger military footprint and influence in the region. Had Tripoli, however, sought an obstructionist path it could have easily helped Tuareg holdouts continue a low-level insurgency for years.
Conclusion
Although limited in scope and scale, the 2006–2009 rebellion is significant in its long-term implications not only for Mali and Niger and their Tuareg populations, but also for the greater trans-Sahara region and the future of international engagement in an increasingly globalized African security environment.
While the 2009 settlement brought peace to Mali and Niger, the Tuareg problem is far from being permanently resolved – especially in Niger. Issues of political and economic marginalization, wealth redistribution, and social integration will continue to challenge the leadership in both these desperately poor countries in the years ahead. As past experience in Mali has shown reconciliation and integration is clearly the way forward, if not to eliminate the problem at least to temper any periodic outbreaks of violence. And for all its strengths, the uniqueness and independent nature of Tuareg society and culture will hamper efforts at greater national integration unless strong internal leadership steps forward. Nonetheless, differences within the Tuareg community over the question of national integration are likely to continue, fueling fragmentation of community and even leading periodically to calls for violent redress. Following the military overthrow of President Tandja in February 2010, Niger is facing the added burden of attempting to restore democratic pluralism while at the same time damping societal divisions in the name of national unity.
The politics of the trans-Sahara have always been complex given the strong historical and socio-economic linkages across countries that all too frequently transform domestic issues into transnational problems. This longstanding regional reality, however, has been further altered by the steady integration of Africa into a globalized world. African problems are no longer the sole prevue of Africans, but have wider security, political and economic implications. The United States and other nations now see the trans-Sahara as warranting their attention; nowhere is this truer than in the battle against international terrorism. But this does not mean that intervention and increased activism is the answer as this case has shown. The United States took the correct approach during the rebellion, albeit as multiple factors caused the stars to align against American intervention. Washington, however, may not be so lucky next time. Thus, a much more nuanced understanding of the drivers of African conflict is needed along with a careful weighing of not only the military implications of intervention, but more importantly the long-term political implications of intervention. Thus, decision-makers would be wise to heed the cautionary words of US Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson, `First and foremost, we must be sensitive to local political dynamics and avoid precipitous actions which exacerbate long-standing and often bloody conflicts.'55
55. US Senate, Johnnie Carson: Opening Remarks for Hearing on Counterterrorism in Africa (Sahel Region).
Notes
1. Emerson6. BBC News. `Rebels Attack Convoy, Base in Niger'. BBC News, 22 June 2006, www.bbcnews.co.uk/news (http://www.bbcnews.co.uk/news)
2. Porch2. Al Jazeera. `Niger's Nomads Fight for Rights'. Al Jazeera, 14 July 2008.
3. International Monetary11. BBC News. `Areva Wins Niger Uranium Licence'. BBC News, 6 January, 2009, www.bbcnews.co.uk/news (http://www.bbcnews.co.uk/news)
`Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative'. The IMF lists Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). United Nations44. Tripoli Post, The. `Gaddafi to Tuareg: "Go Ahead and Enter Niger in Peace"'. The Tripoli Post, 10 October 2009.
4. The Tuareg are best known for the practice of men veiling their faces using a cloth dyed with indigo, which would often rub off on their skin and thus early accounts labeled them the `The Blue Men' of the Sahara Desert.
5. Porch34. Porch, Douglas. 1986. The Conquest of the Sahara , New York: Fromm International Publishing.
6. Porch, Conquest of the Sahara, 8.
7. Porch, Conquest of the Sahara 38. Reuters. `Niger Asks Algeria to Help Fight Desert Rebels'. Reuters, 22 July 2007, www.reuters.com (http://www.reuters.com)
8. Best population estimates of the breakdown are as follows: Algeria – Kel Ahaggar (65,000); Libya – Kel Ajjer (21,000); Burkina Faso – Kel Oudalan (37,000); Niger – Kel Air and Kel Azawagh (720,000); Mali – Kel Adagh, Kel Tadamakat and Kel Azawagh (534,000); Mauritania, Senegal and northern Nigeria (40,000) (The Peoples of the World Foundation, `Indigenous Peoples'; Krings, `Marginalization and Revolt', 57).
9. Council on Foreign7. BBC News. `Al-Qaeda "Issues France Threat"'. BBC News, 14 September, 2006, www.bbcnews.co.uk/news (http://www.bbcnews.co.uk/news)
Agence France-Presse. `Main Tuareg Rebel Destroyed Says Malian Army'. Agence France-Presse, 20 January 2009.
10. BBC News, `Al-Qaeda "Issues France Threat"'.
11. `Africa's "Blue Men" Flee Desert'. Science Christian Monitor, February 11 1992. Comments of a policeman in Timbuktu during the 1990s rebellion.
12. Keenan12. BBC News. `Work Begins on Niger Uranium Mine'. BBC News, 4 May 2009, www.bbcnews.co.uk/news (http://www.bbcnews.co.uk/news)
In 2008, Niger was the world's third largest exporter of uranium after Australia and Canada.
13. Keita, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel, 29.
14. As part of the peace agreement ending the Second Tuareg Rebellion in 1995, 1810 rebels were integrated into the Malian army and another 420 into the police and civil service. See Keita14. Hansen, Andrew and Lauren Vriens. Backgrounder: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Council on Foreign Relations, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12717
15. IRIN, `Government Strikes9. BBC News. `Niger Raid Leaves "Ghost Town"'. BBC News, 19 November 2007, www.bbcnews.co.uk/news (http://www.bbcnews.co.uk/news
16. IRIN, `New Touareg20. IRIN. `Government Strikes New Peace Deal with Tuareg Rebels'. IRIN, 5 July 2006, www.irinnews.org (http://www.irinnews.org).
17. Norris33. Norris, H.T. 1975. The Tuaregs: Their Islamic Legacy and Its Diffusion in the Sahel , Warminster: Aris & Phillips.
The whole of the Air plateau measures nearly 300 miles long from north to south and 150 miles wide `as it rises like an island from the surrounding desert.' `The valleys are green with fan palms, acacias and scattered palms…there are gardens of wheat, onions and tomatoes [that are] irrigated from permanent wells.'
18. BBC News, `Rebels Attack36. Reuters. `Mali Desert Nomads Pledge to Battle al Qaeda group'. Reuters, 2 November 2006, www.reuters.com (http://www.reuters.com)
19. Seeking Alpha, `Tuareg Rebels42. Seeking Alpha. `Tuareg Rebels Threaten Uranium Mining in Niger'. Seeking Alpha, 20 July 2007, http://seekingalpha.com/article/41746-tuareg-rebels-threaten-uranium-mining-in-niger
IRIN, `Niger24. IRIN. `Niger: Rebels Accused of Launching Iraq-inspired "Urban Terror" Campaign'. IRIN, 11 December 2007, www.irinnews.org (http://www.irinnews.org)
20. The New York Times, `Niger Sending30. McGregor, Andrew. 25 February 2009. Government Forces Overrun Tuareg Rebel Camps in Northern Mali. Terrorism Focus , 6(6): 8–9.
IRIN, `Niger: Fighting in North'.
21. IRIN, `New Touareg Rebel Group Speaks Out'. In contrast the government spent $42 million on food assistance in all of 2006, but a government spokesman justified the $60 million military expenditure by saying that `security [in the north] is one of our main priorities'.
22. BBC News, `Niger Raid28. Landmine Monitor. 2008. "Niger: Landmine / ERW Casualties". In Landmine Monitor , Ottawa: International Campaign to Ban Landmines. http://lm.icbl.org
IRIN, `Niger: News27. Krings, T. 1995. Marginalization and Revolt among the Tuareg. GeoJournal , 36(1): 57–63.
23. BBC News, `Tuareg Rebels43. The Peoples of the World Foundation. `Indigenous Peoples of the World – The Tuareg', http://www.peoplesoftheworld.org/text?/people = Tuareg (http://www.peoplesoftheworld.org/text?/people=tuareg)
Reuters. `Niger's Government, Tuareg Rebels Pledge Peace'. Reuters, 7 April 2009, www.reuters.com (http://www.reuters.com)
24. Associated Press, `Rebels Machine Gun Air Force37. Reuters. `Tuareg Rebels Attack Police Post in Northeast Mali'. Reuters, 17 May 2007, www.reuters.com (http://www.reuters.com)
According to a US Air Force spokesman, `the plane was the only U.S. aircraft in the country…' and `had responded to a rare one-time request for help from the government.'
25. Seeking Alpha, `Tuareg Rebels Threaten Uranium Mining in Niger'. Reuters, `Niger22. IRIN. `Niger: Fighting in North but Aid Agencies Hold Firm'. IRIN, June 18 2007, www.irinnews.org (http://www.irinnews.org)
26. VOA News, `Sahara Experts Fear Spread of Niger's Tuareg Rebel Violence'.
27. Landmine Monitor, `Niger: Landmine / ERW26. Keita, Kalifa. May 1998. Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali , Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute.
In 2007 and 2008, land mine explosions in Niger were responsible for killing 46 people and injuring another 139 people.
28. IRIN, `Niger: Rebels29. Les Afriques. `Malian Touareg Rebels, Splintered, Surrender'. Les Afriques, 23 February 2009.
29. IRIN, `Niger: News Filtering out of North'; Internal Displacement10. BBC News. `Tuareg Rebels Raid Mail Army Base'. BBC News, 20 December 2008, www.bbcnews.co.uk/news (http://www.bbcnews.co.uk/news)
30. Al Jazeera, `Niger's32. New York Times, The. `Battle in a Poor Land for Riches Beneath the Soil'. The New York Times, 15 December 2008, www.nytimes.com (http://www.nytimes.com)
31. VOA News, `Cease-Fire Deal Reached'.
32. Amnesty International4. Amnesty International. State of the World's Human Rights – Niger (2008). Amnesty International, 2009, http://archive.amnesty.org/air2008/eng/regions/africa/niger.htm
`At least 16 civilians were reportedly extrajudicially executed by the army and two journalists, both prisoners of conscience, were arrested for their alleged links with the Tuareg armed movement.'
33. Reuters, `Mali Government17. Independent Online. `Niger Defies Critics to Stage Municipal Polls'. Independent Online, 27 December 2009.
34. BBC News, `Tuareg Rebels Raid Mali Army Base'.
35. Agence France-Presse, `Main Tuareg15. Independent Online. `Rebel Chief Says War Only Option'. Independent Online, 25 January 2009, www.iol.co.za (http://www.iol.co.za)
36. Independent Online, `Rebel Chief35. Reuters. `Algerian Militants Ambush Malian Tuaregs, Kill 9'. Reuters, 24 October, 2006, www.reuters.com (http://www.reuters.com)
37. Les Afriques, `Malian Touareg Rebels18. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and the Norwegian Refugee Council. Niger Lull in Conflict Favours Return in North. Geneva: International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 8 September 2009.
38. Reuters, `Niger Group25. Keenan, Jeremy. 2008. Uranium Goes Critical in Niger: Tuareg Rebellions Threaten Sahelian Conflagration. Review of African Political Economy , : 449–66.
39. The surrender of MNJ's Toubou commander, Bocar Mohamed Sougouma, to the government and the creation in May 2008 of the Front of Forces for Rectification (FFR) under the 1990s Tuareg leaders, Rhissa ag Boula and Mohamed Aoutchiki Kriska, reflected early signs of divisions among the Nigerien Tuareg.
40. Independent Online, `Tandja Meets Rebels, Propose Amnesty'. One local analyst believed that Tandja's about-face on negotiations with the rebels was directly tied to `the economic and financial stakes' linked to future foreign development of the country's uranium mining sector. See The New York Times, `Battle in a Poor Land5. Associated Press. `Rebels Machine Gun Air Force C-130'. Associated Press, 14 September 2007.
41. BBC News, `Areva Wins3. American Forces Press Service. `Special Forces Support Pan Sahel Initiative in Africa'. American Forces Press Service, 8, March 2004, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id = 27112 (http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=27112)
Niger Uranium Licence' `Work Begins48. US Government Accounting Office. 31 July 2008. Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership , Washington, DC: GPO. GAO-08-860
on Niger Uranium Mine'.
42. Pipelines International, September 2009, http://pipelinesinternational.com/news/mou_signed_for_trans-sahara/008021/. A memorandum of understanding between Nigeria, Niger, and Algeria was later signed in August 2009; construction of the Nigerien section was estimated to cosft between $400–500 million.
43. Reuters, `Niger's31. New York Times, The. `Niger Sending Troops toward Rebel Area'. The New York Times, 1 July 2007.
Government, Tuareg Rebels Pledge Peace'.
44. Independent Online, `Tandja Meets40. Reuters. `Niger Group Quits Main Tuareg Rebellion Seeks Talks'. Reuters, 11 March 2009, www.reuters.com (http://www.reuters.com)Rebels, Propose Amnesty'.
45. `Gaddafi to Tuareg8. BBC News. `Tuareg Conflict Spreads to Mali'. BBC News, 28 August 2007, www.bbcnews.co.uk/news (http://www.bbcnews.co.uk/news)
"Go Ahead and Enter Niger in Peace"'.
46. Independent Online, `Niger23. IRIN. `Niger: News Filtering out of North Suggests Grave Conditions'. IRIN, 10 December 2007, www.irinnews.org (http://www.irinnews.org)
Defies Critics'.
47. The breakdown is as follows: In Niger some 300 Tuareg fighters and 80 government soldiers were believed to killed, as well as several hundred – the majority civilians – killed or seriously maimed by land mines. The fighting had also displaced 11,000 people, damaged the country's limited infrastructure in the north, and disrupted Niger's critical mining and tourism sectors. In Mali the death toll was much lower with an estimated 50 or so government soldiers killed and an unknown number of rebels dead (probably no more than 100). Several dozen civilians also were killed or injured in land mine explosions and some 1500 people fled the fighting in the north.
48. US House of Representatives46. US Africa Command. Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Fact Sheet, http://www.africom.mil/tsctp.asp
Karl Wycoff: Testimony before the House International Relations Committee. Washington, DC: US House Subcommittee on Africa, 1 April 2004.
49. American Forces Press Service, `Special Forces39. Reuters. Mali Government, Tuareg Agree to Cease-fire Deal, Reuters, 21 July 2008, www.reuters.com (http://www.reuters.com)
Support Pan Sahel Initiative in Africa'.
50. US Department of State52. VOA News. `Cease-Fire Deal Reached Between Mali Government, Tuareg Fighters'. VOA News, 3 April 2008, www.voanews.com (http://www.voanews.com)
`New Counter-Terrorism Initiative to Focus on Saharan Africa'; US Africa51. VOA News. `Sahara Experts Fear Spread of Niger's Tuareg Rebel Violence'. VOA News, 23 August 2007, www.voanews.com (http://www.voanews.com)
Command, Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Fact Sheet. The program has since been renamed the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and Burkina Faso was added in 2009.
51. US Government Accounting Office45. United Nations. Human Development Index, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, GAO-08-860. From October 2005 to October 2008 Niger received $37 million and Mali $31 million of the $229 million spent or obligated by the Department of State, US Agency for International Development, and the Department of Defense under the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative/Partnership.
52. American Forces Press Service, `Special Forces Support Pan Sahel Initiative in Africa'. Comments by US Ambassador Vicki Huddleston.
53. McGregor, `Government Forces Overrun Tuareg Rebel Camps in Northern Mali'.. For example, the government offensive that finally overran the ATNM bases in January 2009 and put ag Bahanga to flight was reportedly led in part by Col. Elhadj Gamou, a Tuareg, from the north.
54. Reuters, `Algerian Militants Ambush Malian Tuaregs, Kill 9'; `Mali Desert16. Independent Online. `Tandja Meets Rebels, Propose Amnesty'. Independent Online, 4 May 2009.
Nomads pledge to battle al Qaeda group'. In October 2006, GSPC/AQIM fighters responded to the killing of one of their deputy commanders in September by launching a revenge attack on Tuareg rebels north of Kidal that left nine rebels dead. In response, an ADC spokesman declared war on the GSPC/AQIM; `we are obligated to attack them' and `we can't negotiate with them… all that is over… we are at war'.
55. US Senate47. US Department of State. New Counter-Terrorism Initiative to Focus on Saharan Africa , Washington, DC: GPO. 17 May 2005
Johnnie Carson: Opening Remarks for Hearing on Counterterrorism in Africa (Sahel Region).
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This article provides an in-depth examination and analysis of the 2006–2009 Tuareg rebellion in Mali and Niger. It identifies the underlying reasons behind the rebellion, explores contrasting counter-insurgency (COIN) strategies employed by the two governments, and presents some lessons learned. While both COIN approaches ultimately produced similar peace settlements, the article argues that the Malian strategy of reconciliation combined with the selective use of force was far more effective than the Nigerien iron fist approach at limiting the size and scope of the insurgency and producing a more sustainable peace. It concludes by looking at the role of external actors, particularly the United States, and how the failure to internationalize the conflict was actually more beneficial to the local COIN effort, as well as to the longer strategic interests of the United States in the region.
Introduction
Africa is certainly no stranger to violence, but the latest chapter in an ancient struggle that took place amid the vast, barren and remote reaches of West Africa's trans-Sahara and two of the poorest countries on earth – – Mali and Niger – has largely been overshadowed by contemporary events in Darfur, the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Somalia. Few observers, in fact, took any notice in early 2006 when Tuareg nomads first in Mali and then a year later in Niger took up arms in a revolt against their central governments. And were it not for the opening of a new front in America's war on terror some three years previously in this heretofore neglected part of the continent, it would have largely remained that way. Although domestic factors behind the conflict in Mali and Niger were completely independent and unrelated to the US war on terror in Africa, Washington soon found itself in danger of becoming entangled in the domestic insurgencies of two of its key counter-terrorism allies. The situation was not an easy one for any party, especially given the strategic implications for domestic stability and regional counter-terrorism efforts, but in the end the best path was chosen by all.
The physical and human terrain
The expansive trans-Sahara region sweeps across parts of nine different countries and some 3500 miles from Mauritania and the Western Sahara on Africa's Atlantic coast to Sudan in the east.1
It encompasses nearly three million square miles (Mali and Niger each are twice the size of France) and is home to approximately 120 million people, many of whom eke out a meager existence much as their forefathers did for centuries before. It is a foreboding place of desert sands and rocky escarpments, as well as semi-arid lands and scattered fertile pockets of cultivation. `But by far the most impressive feature of the Sahara are the great massifs – the Adrar des Iforas, the Air, the Tassili and above all, the Ahaggar whose peak, Tahat, rises to 9573 feet. These stand out like islands in a parched sea, relatively well watered and virtually inaccessible. These are the redoubts in which the Tuareg make their homes.'2
Likewise, the political and socio-economic landscape is just as harsh. A colonial legacy of divide and rule that emphasized racial, ethnic, and cultural differences, combined with little economic investment and poorly developed human capital left the newly independent countries of the trans-Sahara impoverished and ill-prepared to cope with the myriad of challenges facing them. Recourse to heavy-handed authoritarian or military rule in the decades immediately following independence did little to assuage the situation and often made the problems worse by alienating key segments of society, aggravating corruption, and increasingly pushing disenfranchised and marginalized elements to resort to violence. Democratic reforms over the past two decades have helped to address some of these issues, but inadequate resources and backsliding on democracy – particularly in Mauritania in 2008 and in Niger in 2009 – has undercut progress. Despite the prospect of untapped mineral wealth improving national economies, a history of corruption, mismanagement, political and socioeconomic inequities, and authoritarian rule has produced some of the poorest countries on earth and the largest recipients of developmental and humanitarian aid. Six of the nine countries in the region currently suffer from huge international debt and four – including Niger and Mali – rank at or in the bottom 5% of the UN's Human Development Index.3
The IMF lists Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). United Nations. Human Development Index. Joining Niger (182 of 182) and Mali (178 of 182) at the bottom of the UN's Human Development Index rankings are Burkina Faso (177 of 182) and Chad (175 of 182). The trans-Sahara is also home to the Berber people known as the Tuareg–`The Blue Men of the Desert' or the Kel Tagelmoust (`The People of the Veil').4 The Tuareg are best known for the practice of men veiling their faces using a cloth dyed with indigo, which would often rub off on their skin and thus early accounts labeled them the `The Blue Men' of the Sahara Desert.
These tall desert nomads and warriors, whose name means `abandoned of God', have called the central Sahara their home since the thirteenth century and are a fiercely independent and proud people. Raiding towns and farming villages and leveling `taxes' on commerce transiting their territory was a way of life that earned them an infamous reputation as thugs and thieves; `the scorpion and the Tuareg are the only enemies you meet in the desert', according to a Arab saying.5
Others, mainly European travelers and explorers, have painted a more romantic view of the Tuareg as the last of a truly free people to whom the desert was their domain and outsiders intruders. Either way, those who have sought to impose their will over the Tuareg have often lived (or sometimes not) to regret their decision; after 30 years and the loss of countless lives in pacifying the Tuareg, the French government in 1910 was spending 3 million francs per year to administer the Algerian Sahara while receiving only one-tenth the amount back in annual taxes.6
Historically Tuareg society was a complex one with a highly stratified social structure of nobles and vassals, organized into many autonomous but related `drum groups' where familial ties and personal loyalty were highly valued. A central chieftain was elected by the various drum groups to preside over a loose geographic confederation; `his role was in fact more like that of a lord chief justice, an adjudicator of disputes among the people of the drum groups' because the Tuareg `were far too independent to allow themselves to be ruled'.7
Today the estimated 1.5–1.7 million Tuareg are spread across an area from southeastern Algeria to the northern reaches of Burkina Faso in the south and from the southwestern Libyan Desert across Niger and Mali into Mauritania in the west, but the majority of Tuaregs (more than two-thirds) are found in Mali and Niger (see Figure 1).8
8. Best population estimates of the breakdown are as follows: Algeria – Kel Ahaggar (65,000); Libya – Kel Ajjer (21,000); Burkina Faso – Kel Oudalan (37,000); Niger – Kel Air and Kel Azawagh (720,000); Mali – Kel Adagh, Kel Tadamakat and Kel Azawagh (534,000); Mauritania, Senegal and northern Nigeria (40,000) (The Peoples of the World Foundation, `Indigenous Peoples'; Krings, `Marginalization and Revolt', 57).
This post-colonial fragmentation has reduced the Tuareg to minority status in every country – no more than 10% of the population at most – and they are often viewed with suspect loyalties, which in turn have fueled Tuareg claims of discrimination and economic neglect at the hands of their respective governments.
Sadly, terrorism has been a defining feature of the region too. The violent and bloody Algerian civil war in the 1990s, gave rise to several terrorist and criminal groups that now operate across the region. One of these groups, the Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat or GSPC as it is known by its French acronym) broke with the main Algerian Islamist leadership in 1998 to align itself with al Qaeda and the wider international jihadist movement.9
On 11 September 2006, al Qaeda's Ayman al-Zawahiri publicly announced his organization's merger with the GSPC and its new name: al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); `Osama Bin Laden has told me to announce to Muslims that the GSPC has joined al-Qaeda' and `we pray to God that our brothers from the GSPC succeed in causing harm to the top members of the crusader coalition, and particularly their leader, the vicious America.'10
The leadership of AQIM in return pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden. Since that time AQIM has embarked upon a deadly campaign of bombings across North Africa, ambushes of military and police personnel, kidnappings, and attacks on foreigners across Algeria and its neighboring countries that has left dozens killed and scores wounded.
Roots of the conflict
Since independence from France in the 1960s, both Mali and Niger have struggled to overcome longstanding historical, political, cultural, and socioeconomic divisions within their societies. For the past 50 years the Tuareg communities of Mali and Niger have found themselves inextricably caught up in this search for national identity and inclusion, as well as in repeated revolts against central authority (Mali 1962–1964 and 1990–1995; Niger 1990–1995). Alternating government strategies of retribution and reconciliation over the years have produced some respite, but never yielded a permanent solution because many of the grievances that sparked past rebellions were never effectively resolved.
Over the years Tuareg grievances have tended to center around three main issues:
Marginalization and discrimination
As distinct racial and cultural minorities, the Tuareg in Mali and Niger have often–consciously and unconsciously – been neglected by their central governments, which are dominated by black southerners. And racial discrimination has been a fact of life; Tuaregs are `animals, murderers. The only solution is to kill them.'11
Thus, a key demand in every peace agreement has been improved Tuareg representation in the government and military. While significant progress has been made over the years on this issue (most notably in the militaries), many Tuareg still feel much more needs to be done.
Exploitative development policies
The remote northern regions of Mali and Niger that the Tuaregs call home, have historically received little in the way of national development assistance and employment opportunities. Part of the problem is purely demographic (these are relatively sparely populated areas) and the other an overall scarcity of government resources. This issue is further compounded in Niger where income from the uranium mines in the Tuareg north now accounts for 72% of Nigerien export income with a potential six-fold revenue increase expected over the coming decade.12
Not only do the Tuareg feel that they are not getting their fair share of this income, but often reckless mining practices threaten the delicate ecosystem that supports the traditional livelihood of thousands of Tuareg nomads.
Greater regional autonomy and demilitarization
Although the politics of decolonization in the 1950s shattered any hope for the creation of an independent Tuareg homeland, the search for greater self-rule and protection of the Tamasheq language and Tuareg culture continues to resonant strongly in both Mali and Niger.
From a more practical perspective, increased localized control and a reduced army presence in the Kidel Region of Mali and in Niger's Agadez Region would facilitate the smooth functioning of the informal – and often illicit – transnational commerce on which the Tuareg have become increasingly dependent. It would also give the Tuareg a greater political say in their region's natural resource development.
While all the above factors have been present in varying degrees over the course of the past five decades, it was a convergence of seemingly unrelated localized events that spun out of control, first in Mali in 2006 and then in early 2007 in neighboring Niger. The new rebellions came as particularly bad news to many of those in Mali who saw the 1995 peace accords as laying the groundwork for lasting peace and reconciliation. One senior army officer observed in 1998 that, `This is one case in which ethnic [sic – racial] trauma appears to have been solved by a government willing to deal simultaneously with the root causes as well as the symptoms of conflict, and a case in which leaders on both sides of a difficult divide have shown vision and political courage.'13
The Tuareg rebel – again
Trouble that had been brewing in Mali between the government and its Tuareg minority for several years finally boiled over in March 2006 with the desertion of about 60 former Tuareg rebels from the Malian army.14 As part of the peace agreement ending the Second Tuareg Rebellion in 1995, 1810 rebels were integrated into the Malian army and another 420 into the police and civil service.
The deserters, under the leadership of former Lt. Col. Hassan ag Fagaga, began launching a series of attacks in May on government outposts in the northeast of the country to seize arms and supplies. Soon afterward the rebels established themselves in the old Tuareg strongholds high in the Tigharghar Mountains of the Kidal Region, not far from the Algerian border. Rather than unleash the army on the Tuareg malcontents, the government of President Amadou Toumani Toure, drawing on lessons from the Second Tuareg Rebellion in the 1990s, sought to reach a peaceful settlement to the crisis; `I am a soldier of peace. My role is not to pour oil on the fire.'15
This non-confrontational stance and an Algerian-broker agreement, addressing Tuareg concerns about the lack of local empowerment and economic development, produced a peace deal in July with the Mai 23, 2006 Alliance democratique pour le changement (Democratic Alliance for Change or ADC) signing in February 2007. The revolt was over, the disarmament process underway, and a volatile situation had been defused. Or so it seemed.
As things appeared to be cooling down in Mali, the focus shifted to neighboring Niger where conflict had ignited on 8 February 2007 when a small group of Nigerien Tuareg attacked a government position near the traditional Tuareg stronghold of Iferouane, which lies on the western edge of the Air Mountains in the far north of the country. A heretofore unknown group, the Mouvement des Nigerien pour la Justice (Niger Movement for Justice or MNJ in French) claimed responsibility for the attack. The MNJ claimed its action was the result of the Nigerien government's inability to address longstanding Tuareg political and economic grievances. According to a MNJ spokesman, `The movement was created because nothing has been done by the government. There is no work, no schools, not even drinking water in all Niger. It's terrible, it's a genocide, and the government is corrupt…'16
The next several months witnessed a series of sporadic MNJ attacks on towns and government garrisons in and around the Air massif – whose peaks rise to some 6000 feet17 The whole of the Air plateau measures nearly 300 miles long from north to south and 150 miles wide `as it rises like an island from the surrounding desert.' `The valleys are green with fan palms, acacias and scattered palms…there are gardens of wheat, onions and tomatoes [that are] irrigated from permanent wells.'
– to the north of the regional capital of Agadez. The rebels also began laying anti-vehicle land mines in an effort to interdict road traffic between key towns and attacked a power plant serving the uranium mining town of Arlit in April. An up tick in rebel activity in June and July resulted in the deaths of 15 soldiers and the capture another 70 after the MNJ overran a government outpost northeast of Iferouane.18
And in a daring twilight raid, about two dozen Tuareg rebels attacked the Agadez airport, which did little real damage but inflicted a psychological blow on the government. Likewise, foreign workers in the uranium mining industry were targeted by the rebels with a Chinese company official being kidnaped, but later released. This increasing insecurity led to the periodic halting of mining activity, as well as the suspension of some humanitarian aid deliveries in late 2007.19
The Nigerien government reacted to this `increased banditry', as it was officially characterized, by rushing 4000 troops to the north in July 2007 and the governor banned all travel except by military convoy in the affected areas and imposed a dusk to dawn curfew on the regional capital.20 Earlier in May the government redirected $60 million to support military operations in the north.21
In contrast the government spent $42 million on food assistance in all of 2006, but a government spokesman justified the $60 million military expenditure by saying that `security [in the north] is one of our main priorities'.
As conditions continued to deteriorate, however, President Mamadou Tandja declared a state of emergency for the Agadez Region on 24 August. Using its emergency powers the government reportedly made dozens of arrests and detentions, as well as instituted a press blackout on reporting of the escalating violence. In an apparent effort to undercut popular support for the rebels, the army forcefully relocated to areas south of Agadez about 80% – up to 4000 people – of the population of Iferouane.22
Meanwhile back in Mali, the rebellion once again was heating up. A splinter group of Tuareg fighters under the leadership of Ibrahim ag Bahanga, a former Malian army officer and rebel commander from the 1990s revolt, began launching attacks in May 2007 on isolated government positions, attacking supply convoys, kidnaping soldiers, and mining roads to the north of the regional capital of Kidal. Ag Bahanga formally broke in August with the main ADC leadership – which had disowned him – to form the Alliance-Touareg-Niger-Mali (ATNM) and claimed to have formed an alliance with his Tuareg brethren in Niger.23
By September the renewed fighting had left dozens killed or injured (mainly as a result of land mine explosions), at least 35 government soldiers held captive, and ATNM rebels besieging the remote army outpost of Tin-Zawatine on the Mali-Algeria border. It was during this siege that the only reported incidence of American military involvement took place when a US Air Force C-130 transport aircraft (in the country supporting a training mission) air dropped some 14,000 pounds of food to the beleaguered garrison at the request of the Malian government. In the course of the operation the C-130 was hit by small arms fire from the rebels and received minor damage.24
According to a US Air Force spokesman, `the plane was the only U.S. aircraft in the country…' and `had responded to a rare one-time request for help from the government.'
Despite their relatively small numbers – the MNJ claimed that defections from the army had swollen its ranks to over 2000 fighters
and active Malian rebels probably numbered well under 1000 – the Tuareg revolts in Mali and Niger appeared to be gaining momentum at the end of 2007 and several regional experts, such as Jeremy Keenan, began warning of an increasingly explosive situation with `the threat of a wider almost trans-Saharan conflagration of the rebellion.'26
No end in sight
Both in Mali and Niger a pattern of low intensity warfare quickly developed. Tuareg fighters would lay siege to isolated government outposts, lay mines and ambush military convoys, launch periodic armed raids, and seize hostages before returning to their mountain hideouts. Government forces would respond to these incidents by attempting to hunt down the marauding bands and seize rebel supply caches. Just as in Mali, several clashes between Nigerien rebels and army troops toward the end of year resulted in civilian deaths with each side blaming the other. Likewise, the widespread use of anti-vehicle land mines by both Malian and Nigerien rebels increased the potential for civilian casualties.27 In 2007 and 2008, land mine explosions in Niger were responsible for killing 46 people and injuring another 139 people.
Their first use in November and December 2007 far southwest of the MNJ's normal operational area raised the specter of a wider bombing campaign aimed at the more populous parts of Niger,28
but these fears failed to materialize. Humanitarian organizations, however, were claiming that by the end of 2007, at least 11,000 people had been displaced as a result of insecurity in Niger's Agadez Region and critically needed food aid deliveries suspended.29
The year ended with neither the governments nor the Tuareg rebels gaining the upper hand.
The start of 2008 saw a geographic and political widening of the Nigerien conflict. In January MNJ fighters killed several policemen and soldiers and took nearly a dozen hostages, including a senior government official, following an attack on a town nearly 200 miles southeast of Agadez. The rebels also claimed to have been joined by many ethnic Toubous veterans from southeastern Niger who rose up against the government in the 1990s. This, along with claimed defections of Hausa officers from the army and support from southern Fulani nomads, increased the rebel strength to 3000–3500 and indicated a broadening of support for the rebellion, according to the MNJ.30
Despite this apparent momentum, the rebels were unable to sustain the pace and scope of their operations outside the Air Mountains and by May government forces seized the initiative and went on the offensive in an attempt to impose a military solution.
By contrast in neighboring Mali, the Toure government sought to complement its use of military force with diplomacy by seeking political accommodation with moderate Tuareg elements, many of whom were displeased with the often indiscriminate violence of some rebel factions. Despite a flare up of military activity in March 2008, including a deadly attack by ag Bahanga's ATNM forces on a convoy north of Kidal, a Libyan-negotiated cease-fire and prisoner exchange was reached in April.31
Unfortunately, the respite was short lived as each side accused the other failing to honor the agreement and significant fighting resume in mountains north of Kidal during May and into July of 2008.
The last half of the year in Niger saw a series of significant clashes between the rebels and army in and around the Air Mountains with each side claiming to have inflicted severe losses on the other.
The rebels continued to mine roads, mount ambushes against government convoys, launch sporadic raids, and seize hostages. The army for its part launched both ground and air assaults on suspected MNJ bases, while seeking to recapture previously lost positions and encircle the rebel's mountain stronghold. November witnessed some of the heaviest fighting – and resultant civilian deaths – as government forces sought to establish inroads into the mountains north of Agadez. Heavy-handed clearing operations against Tuareg villages lead the MNJ to level charges of `ethnic genocide' and Amnesty International condemned the Tandja regime for serious human rights abuses, including the extra-judicial executions of Tuareg civilians by the army.32 `At least 16 civilians were reportedly extrajudicially executed by the army and two journalists, both prisoners of conscience, were arrested for their alleged links with the Tuareg armed movement.' The year 2008 ended on much the same note as 2007 with rebel activity hindering, but not stopping, uranium mining and with the Nigerien army unsuccessful in its efforts to militarily crush the rebels. The Agadez Region remained under a state of emergency.
Momentum for peace
While on the surface neither Bamako's `talk and thump' strategy of combining selective military force with political accommodation or Niamey's `iron fist' strategy of imposing a military solution appeared any closer to resolving their respective Tuareg problems, pressure was steadily building on all parties that would finally prove decisive in bringing peace to both countries.
In Mali behind the scene Algerian-mediated talks between the government and the ADC, which comprised the bulk of the rebels, produced yet another cease-fire in July 2008.33
The lone holdout was ag Bahanga's increasingly hardline ATNM faction, which refused to take part in the talks. In an apparent effort to undercut the cease-fire, the ATNM sought to widen the conflict by launching a series of raids and land mine attacks far outside the Kidel Region. A particularly deadly attack took place on 20 December when ag Bahanga's forces assaulted an army position near the Mauritania border leaving up to 20 soldiers dead and fleeing with several hostages.34
The government's response was to launch an all out offensive against ag Bahanga. On 20 January 2009 government forces destroyed the ATNM main base in the mountains near the Algerian border. The army claimed to have killed some 30 rebels and captured 22 more, as well as large quantities of food and war material.35 Although ag Bahanga remained defiant in the face of this defeat: `Our position is clear: the only alternative we have is reprisal and armed warfare;'36
the end was near. His forces shattered, denounced by his fellow Tuareg commanders, with little popular support, and hard pressed by the Malian army, he and the remnants of his forces fled into Algeria and then eventually to Libya. By February, press reports indicated that hundreds of Tuareg fighters were surrendering their arms and peace talks between the ADC leadership and the government were in their final stages.37
Peace had apparently finally come to Mali's troubled north.
In Niger a series of political and economic developments were also quietly pushing Tuareg rebels and the government toward negotiations. Suppressed personal jealousies, political rivalries, and differing war strategies among competing Tuareg factions finally came to a head in early 2009 when many prominent MNJ commanders and their European supporters broke with the main MNJ leadership and announced the formation of the Front Patriotique Nigerien (Nigerien Patriotic Front or FPN) in March.38
This splintering of the MNJ (combined with other smaller defections in 2008 The surrender of MNJ's Toubou commander, Bocar Mohamed Sougouma, to the government and the creation in May 2008 of the Front of Forces for Rectification (FFR) under the 1990s Tuareg leaders, Rhissa ag Boula and Mohamed Aoutchiki Kriska, reflected early signs of divisions among the Nigerien Tuareg.
) energized various competing Tuareg factions to enter into talks with the government or face being marginalized in the peace process. Despite having vowed never to negotiate with `bandits' and `drug traffickers', President Tandja found himself under growing diplomatic pressure from Mummar Qaddafi, the African Union Chairman and long time Tuareg supporter, to reach a peaceful settlement with the rebels. Likewise, international economic interests in Niger's increasingly lucrative uranium and hydrocarbon sector were pushing for a resolution of the crisis.40One local analyst believed that Tandja's about-face on negotiations with the rebels was directly tied to `the economic and financial stakes' linked to future foreign development of the country's uranium mining sector. See The New York Times, `Battle in a Poor Land for Riches Beneath the Soil' for a look at the international economic dimensions of the conflict.
The French, as point of fact, had already committed themselves to investing $1.5 billion and the opening, of what would be the world's second largest uranium mine at Imouraren by 2012.41
The Tandja government was also deeply involved in negotiations over the proposed $12 billion, 2700 mile-long Trans-Sahara gas pipeline that would bring natural gas from Nigeria to Algeria by transiting Nigerien territory.42 A memorandum of understanding between Nigeria, Niger, and Algeria was later signed in August 2009; construction of the Nigerien section was estimated to cosft between $400–500 million.
Libyan-brokered talks between the government and the three major Nigerien Tuareg rebel groups began in earnest in April 2009 with all sides agreeing to seek a peaceful end to the conflict; `all those taking part in this mission now have the historic responsibility to overcome their differences and realise these commitments, which must now be transformed into a formal peace agreement', announced an FPN spokesman.43
By May significant progress had been made to have President Tandja meet personally with representatives from the three rebel groups at Agadez and promise amnesty to disarming Tuareg fighters. `For a long time we have asked them to put down their weapons and come build the country with us. We forgive them because we want peace in Niger,' said the Nigerien President.44
After fits and starts, the Libya talks yielded a final peace accord on 6 October 2009 whereby both Nigerien and the remaining Malian rebels under ag Bahanga would cease fighting and move toward a peaceful resolution of their differences. Proclaimed Qaddafi in announcing the accord, `It is an historic day and momentous hour as our Tuareg brothers in Mali and Niger have decided to make peace and lay down their weapons.'45
Although modalities for addressing Tuareg grievances had yet to be finalized, the bulk of the remaining 2000 or so Nigerien Tuareg fighters were disarmed and amnestied by November and Niamey lifted the more than two year old state of emergency in the Agadez Region. By the end of the year the few last remaining rebel holdouts finally came to terms with the government and surrender their weapons too.46
46. Independent Online, `Niger Defies Critics'. View all notes
Peace had at long last come to Niger.
After three and a half years of on again, off again fighting the guns had fallen silent in both Mali and Niger. By African standards the 2006–2009 Tuareg rebellion barely registered on conflict-ridden continent: Less than 10,000 government troops fighting about 4000 rebels that resulted in well under 1000 total military and civilian casualties. The fighting also internally displaced about 12,500 people (nowhere near the 150,000 refugees that the 1990's rebellions had generated) and disrupted economic activity and development efforts in two of the poorest countries in the world.47
47. The breakdown is as follows: In Niger some 300 Tuareg fighters and 80 government soldiers were believed to killed, as well as several hundred – the majority civilians – killed or seriously maimed by land mines. The fighting had also displaced 11,000 people, damaged the country's limited infrastructure in the north, and disrupted Niger's critical mining and tourism sectors. In Mali the death toll was much lower with an estimated 50 or so government soldiers killed and an unknown number of rebels dead (probably no more than 100). Several dozen civilians also were killed or injured in land mine explosions and some 1500 people fled the fighting in the north.
Lessons learned
While admittedly the Third Tuareg Rebellion was but a minor blip on a continent struggling to overcome endemic violent conflict, several highly relevant political-military lessons – for both Africans and non-Africans alike – can be gleaned from the rebellion.
First and foremost, festering socio-economic problems provided terribly effective tinder for fueling armed conflict despite the best efforts of governments to defuse them and once ignited the violence can rapidly escalate. Longstanding Tuareg grievances and feelings of alienation were the underlying catalysts that feed the rebellions in Mali and Niger, despite both governments awareness of the danger. The rebellion in Mali, however, assuredly came as a bitter disappointment to those supporters of a reconciliation and integration strategy to addressing their Tuareg problem – an approach that had after all produced 10 years of relative peace and stability. Thus, despite pursuing radically different approaches (conciliation vs. coercion) to defusing the threat, neither government was able to preempt an armed insurrection. This does not mean that both pre-conflict approaches produced the same result. Mali's Tuareg revolt was much more limited in scope, short-lived and quickly resolved, whereas Niger had to face a much larger and full-blown rebellion that proved more challenging to end.
A corollary finding is that domestic problems in Africa rarely remain so, but can quickly become regionalized and caught up in wider regional politics and external objectives. This in turn makes the prosecution and resolution of such `domestic' conflicts increasingly challenging as the complexity of the conflict and the number of associated actors involved grows. This is especially true when powerful transnational or regional linkages, such as common cultural, ethnic or racial identities are involved, or when governments seek to make use of dissident elements in neighboring countries to advance their own foreign policy and security agendas. The old Arab saying that `the enemy of my enemy is my friend' is particularly relevant in these situations. Thus, without some regional solution to these `domestic' conflicts, prospects for any sustainable peace are fleeting.
Although success on the battlefield (particularly in the Malian instance) was important in pushing the insurgents into negotiations, the ultimate counter-insurgency solution was, not surprisingly, a political one. Using selective military force to achieve a political settlement has long been one of the foundational elements of modern-day counter-insurgency strategy, but in the face of an active insurgency it is one that can also be easily compromised. Political solutions take time. Negotiations are usually long and drawn out affairs peppered with multiple setbacks along the path to a final settlement, while military force offers the illusion of a quick and decisive end to the conflict. Thus, the tendency to opt for the appealing military fix is thus difficult for governments to avoid. This was certainly the case in Niger, where the Tandja government place heavy emphasis on the military side of the equation and its iron fist strategy to quell the rebellion, but ultimately had to rely on negotiations to bring about a final settlement. In sharp contrast, the Toure government in Mali never lost sight of the need to temper its military response by making it subservient to the long-term political objective of achieving a negotiated settlement. This was especially remarkable given the sense of betrayal after pursuing years of reconciliation and the forces advocating an iron fist response could have easily won the day. Moreover, in the Malian case the well-calculated military response kept the vast majority of the Tuareg community from going over to the rebels and helped to later fragment the insurgent cause.
Finally, the role (or non-role) of external actors – as in many insurgencies – was critical in determining not only the course and direction of the rebellion, but was also essential to bringing about an end to the conflict. The contrasting roles of the United States and Libya during the rebellion, moreover, highlight several important counter-insurgency lessons that bear remembering.
For the United States
External involvement is normally viewed from the perspective of assistance to the insurgents or the government, but few observers rarely weigh the impact of non-involvement by a key actor on the conflict and its ultimate outcome. The failure of the United States to become involved in the counter-insurgency effort when all signs were pointing toward American intervention in 2006–2007 was a significant positive milestone, because it avoided needlessly globalizing and escalating the conflict by tying it to America's war on terror. This was all the more surprising given the growing US perception since 2002 of the trans-Sahara as becoming a developing security threat; `the traditional caravan routes in this region now serve as conduits for illegal migration and drugs and arms trafficking, as well as a hideout and staging areas for international and regional terrorists and criminals'.48
Under the US Department of State's direction, Washington initially initiated the $7.75 million Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) in November 2002 to assist Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad in improving their border security and counter-terrorism capabilities. The initial focus was on increasing information sharing and the training and equipping of 150-man rapid reaction companies in each of the four PSI countries.
The United States expanded its engagement with the creation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) in 2005 by enlarging the PSI program to cover five additional countries – Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia – and increased funding to $100 million per year for five years. The program has since been renamed the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and Burkina Faso was added in 2009.
At the time of the first stirring of unrest among the Malian Tuareg in the spring of 2006, President Toure's government was a staunch and critical regional ally of the United States in the war on terror. Moreover, Mali and Niger, which together accounted for 30% of all TSCTI spending
From October 2005 to October 2008 Niger received $37 million and Mali $31 million of the $229 million spent or obligated by the Department of State, US Agency for International Development, and the Department of Defense under the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative/Partnership. View all notes
were at what Washington clearly perceived to be the epicenter of its war on terror in the trans-Sahara. `By cooperating with Mali to better protect its borders and territory, we can help keep it from being used by terrorists. This makes Mali a very important partner in the war on terrorism,' according to the US Embassy in Bamako.
Maintaining the support of the regimes in Mali and Niger would certainly be essential to the success of American counter-terrorism efforts in the region. Thus, it may come as somewhat of a surprise that the United States carefully eschewed involvement in the Malian and Nigerien rebellions. What is even more surprising is that both Bamako and Niamey wanted it this way, although for far different reasons.
Several factors appear to account for this unexpected convergence:
1.
Despite the rebellion's unpleasant reminder that Mali had not completely resolved its Tuareg problem, the Toure government undoubtedly felt confident in its ability to address the situation on its own. Past experience had shown that a negotiated settlement was possible – if not the ultimate outcome – and that talks between the government and the rebels were more likely to resolve the crisis than through force of arms alone.
2.
Relatively speaking, the Mali rebellion also involved only a small number – 800 to 1000 – of disgruntled Tuaregs and was generally confined to the far northeast of the country. In addition, the rebels lacked any significant degree of popular support within the larger Tuareg community and many of their subsequent actions further isolated them. Moreover, the vast majority of Tuaregs brought into the government and military after 1995, in fact, remained loyal to the regime throughout the rebellion and some of the most effective Malian army units were lead by Tuareg officers. For example, the government offensive that finally overran the ATNM bases in January 2009 and put ag Bahanga to flight was reportedly led in part by Col. Elhadj Gamou, a Tuareg, from the north.
3.
In Niger President Tandja, who was bent on seeking a military solution, undoubtedly worried that seeking US assistance would be seen as a sign of weakness to both his political opposition and the rebels. He also probably calculated that any American security assistance would come with significant strings attached, especially in the areas of human rights and democratic reform. Thus, this kind of help he didn't need and it would be far too politically costly to his regime.
4.
The Nigerien regime also had to be concerned about possible negative international and regional reaction to bringing the Americans into the conflict. Continued French and Chinese investment in, and development of, the country's uranium mining sector was critical to the Nigerien economy. Greater US involvement in the country could jeopardize these carefully cultivated economic and political relationships. Moreover, President Tandja almost certainly did not want to be seen as weak in the face of the `banditry' in the north and thereby undermine his bargaining position with international mining companies by leaning on the Americans for military help. Qaddafi was also a wild card; Libya had played a key role in arming and supporting Tuareg rebels in the past and US military involvement on Libya's doorstep might just inflame the situation again.
5.
While undoubtedly some elements within the US government would have liked to increase the American military footprint in the region by opportunistically assisting Mali and Niger in their counterinsurgency efforts, the strain of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, US European Command's pre-occupation with a resurgent Russia, and the pending stand up of the new US Africa Command made this all but impossible. State Department officials worried over the potential repercussions in Africa and the Middle East of increased American involvement also appeared to have advocated a hands-off approach. The strongest argument against greater US military engagement with Mali and Niger, however, was the complete lack of a terror convergence between Islamist extremists – such as AQIM – and the Tuareg rebels. In fact, the two were bitter foes, having clashed numerous times prior to the rebellions (and would fight each other during the course of this conflict too)
In October 2006, GSPC/AQIM fighters responded to the killing of one of their deputy commanders in September by launching a revenge attack on Tuareg rebels north of Kidal that left nine rebels dead. In response, an ADC spokesman declared war on the GSPC/AQIM; `we are obligated to attack them' and `we can't negotiate with them… all that is over… we are at war'.
Thus, there was little benefit, but enormous risk to the United States should it seek a greater role in helping Mali and Niger suppress their rebellions.
The end result was that the United States and its war on terror were kept at arms length. It avoided the strategic risks of becoming entangled in Mali's and Niger's internal affairs and both Bamako and Niamey went on to successfully resolve their Tuareg problems. Everyone appeared to come out a winner.
For regional actors
The other key external actor was Libya, which heretofore had been largely seen as a destabilizing force in the region given its active support to Tuareg rebels in the past in terms of arms and sanctuary. For both African and international consumption, President Gadhafi saw it in his interest as African Union Chairman to act as a peace intermediary this time round and he was able successfully to leverage his position with the rebels to force them into accepting a negotiated settlement. Thus Gadhafi not only burnished his credentials as an African peacemaker, but he successfully kept the United States and France from gaining a larger military footprint and influence in the region. Had Tripoli, however, sought an obstructionist path it could have easily helped Tuareg holdouts continue a low-level insurgency for years.
Conclusion
Although limited in scope and scale, the 2006–2009 rebellion is significant in its long-term implications not only for Mali and Niger and their Tuareg populations, but also for the greater trans-Sahara region and the future of international engagement in an increasingly globalized African security environment.
While the 2009 settlement brought peace to Mali and Niger, the Tuareg problem is far from being permanently resolved – especially in Niger. Issues of political and economic marginalization, wealth redistribution, and social integration will continue to challenge the leadership in both these desperately poor countries in the years ahead. As past experience in Mali has shown reconciliation and integration is clearly the way forward, if not to eliminate the problem at least to temper any periodic outbreaks of violence. And for all its strengths, the uniqueness and independent nature of Tuareg society and culture will hamper efforts at greater national integration unless strong internal leadership steps forward. Nonetheless, differences within the Tuareg community over the question of national integration are likely to continue, fueling fragmentation of community and even leading periodically to calls for violent redress. Following the military overthrow of President Tandja in February 2010, Niger is facing the added burden of attempting to restore democratic pluralism while at the same time damping societal divisions in the name of national unity.
The politics of the trans-Sahara have always been complex given the strong historical and socio-economic linkages across countries that all too frequently transform domestic issues into transnational problems. This longstanding regional reality, however, has been further altered by the steady integration of Africa into a globalized world. African problems are no longer the sole prevue of Africans, but have wider security, political and economic implications. The United States and other nations now see the trans-Sahara as warranting their attention; nowhere is this truer than in the battle against international terrorism. But this does not mean that intervention and increased activism is the answer as this case has shown. The United States took the correct approach during the rebellion, albeit as multiple factors caused the stars to align against American intervention. Washington, however, may not be so lucky next time. Thus, a much more nuanced understanding of the drivers of African conflict is needed along with a careful weighing of not only the military implications of intervention, but more importantly the long-term political implications of intervention. Thus, decision-makers would be wise to heed the cautionary words of US Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson, `First and foremost, we must be sensitive to local political dynamics and avoid precipitous actions which exacerbate long-standing and often bloody conflicts.'55
55. US Senate, Johnnie Carson: Opening Remarks for Hearing on Counterterrorism in Africa (Sahel Region).
Notes
1. Emerson6. BBC News. `Rebels Attack Convoy, Base in Niger'. BBC News, 22 June 2006, www.bbcnews.co.uk/news (http://www.bbcnews.co.uk/news)
2. Porch2. Al Jazeera. `Niger's Nomads Fight for Rights'. Al Jazeera, 14 July 2008.
3. International Monetary11. BBC News. `Areva Wins Niger Uranium Licence'. BBC News, 6 January, 2009, www.bbcnews.co.uk/news (http://www.bbcnews.co.uk/news)
`Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative'. The IMF lists Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). United Nations44. Tripoli Post, The. `Gaddafi to Tuareg: "Go Ahead and Enter Niger in Peace"'. The Tripoli Post, 10 October 2009.
4. The Tuareg are best known for the practice of men veiling their faces using a cloth dyed with indigo, which would often rub off on their skin and thus early accounts labeled them the `The Blue Men' of the Sahara Desert.
5. Porch34. Porch, Douglas. 1986. The Conquest of the Sahara , New York: Fromm International Publishing.
6. Porch, Conquest of the Sahara, 8.
7. Porch, Conquest of the Sahara 38. Reuters. `Niger Asks Algeria to Help Fight Desert Rebels'. Reuters, 22 July 2007, www.reuters.com (http://www.reuters.com)
8. Best population estimates of the breakdown are as follows: Algeria – Kel Ahaggar (65,000); Libya – Kel Ajjer (21,000); Burkina Faso – Kel Oudalan (37,000); Niger – Kel Air and Kel Azawagh (720,000); Mali – Kel Adagh, Kel Tadamakat and Kel Azawagh (534,000); Mauritania, Senegal and northern Nigeria (40,000) (The Peoples of the World Foundation, `Indigenous Peoples'; Krings, `Marginalization and Revolt', 57).
9. Council on Foreign7. BBC News. `Al-Qaeda "Issues France Threat"'. BBC News, 14 September, 2006, www.bbcnews.co.uk/news (http://www.bbcnews.co.uk/news)
Agence France-Presse. `Main Tuareg Rebel Destroyed Says Malian Army'. Agence France-Presse, 20 January 2009.
10. BBC News, `Al-Qaeda "Issues France Threat"'.
11. `Africa's "Blue Men" Flee Desert'. Science Christian Monitor, February 11 1992. Comments of a policeman in Timbuktu during the 1990s rebellion.
12. Keenan12. BBC News. `Work Begins on Niger Uranium Mine'. BBC News, 4 May 2009, www.bbcnews.co.uk/news (http://www.bbcnews.co.uk/news)
In 2008, Niger was the world's third largest exporter of uranium after Australia and Canada.
13. Keita, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel, 29.
14. As part of the peace agreement ending the Second Tuareg Rebellion in 1995, 1810 rebels were integrated into the Malian army and another 420 into the police and civil service. See Keita14. Hansen, Andrew and Lauren Vriens. Backgrounder: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Council on Foreign Relations, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12717
15. IRIN, `Government Strikes9. BBC News. `Niger Raid Leaves "Ghost Town"'. BBC News, 19 November 2007, www.bbcnews.co.uk/news (http://www.bbcnews.co.uk/news
16. IRIN, `New Touareg20. IRIN. `Government Strikes New Peace Deal with Tuareg Rebels'. IRIN, 5 July 2006, www.irinnews.org (http://www.irinnews.org).
17. Norris33. Norris, H.T. 1975. The Tuaregs: Their Islamic Legacy and Its Diffusion in the Sahel , Warminster: Aris & Phillips.
The whole of the Air plateau measures nearly 300 miles long from north to south and 150 miles wide `as it rises like an island from the surrounding desert.' `The valleys are green with fan palms, acacias and scattered palms…there are gardens of wheat, onions and tomatoes [that are] irrigated from permanent wells.'
18. BBC News, `Rebels Attack36. Reuters. `Mali Desert Nomads Pledge to Battle al Qaeda group'. Reuters, 2 November 2006, www.reuters.com (http://www.reuters.com)
19. Seeking Alpha, `Tuareg Rebels42. Seeking Alpha. `Tuareg Rebels Threaten Uranium Mining in Niger'. Seeking Alpha, 20 July 2007, http://seekingalpha.com/article/41746-tuareg-rebels-threaten-uranium-mining-in-niger
IRIN, `Niger24. IRIN. `Niger: Rebels Accused of Launching Iraq-inspired "Urban Terror" Campaign'. IRIN, 11 December 2007, www.irinnews.org (http://www.irinnews.org)
20. The New York Times, `Niger Sending30. McGregor, Andrew. 25 February 2009. Government Forces Overrun Tuareg Rebel Camps in Northern Mali. Terrorism Focus , 6(6): 8–9.
IRIN, `Niger: Fighting in North'.
21. IRIN, `New Touareg Rebel Group Speaks Out'. In contrast the government spent $42 million on food assistance in all of 2006, but a government spokesman justified the $60 million military expenditure by saying that `security [in the north] is one of our main priorities'.
22. BBC News, `Niger Raid28. Landmine Monitor. 2008. "Niger: Landmine / ERW Casualties". In Landmine Monitor , Ottawa: International Campaign to Ban Landmines. http://lm.icbl.org
IRIN, `Niger: News27. Krings, T. 1995. Marginalization and Revolt among the Tuareg. GeoJournal , 36(1): 57–63.
23. BBC News, `Tuareg Rebels43. The Peoples of the World Foundation. `Indigenous Peoples of the World – The Tuareg', http://www.peoplesoftheworld.org/text?/people = Tuareg (http://www.peoplesoftheworld.org/text?/people=tuareg)
Reuters. `Niger's Government, Tuareg Rebels Pledge Peace'. Reuters, 7 April 2009, www.reuters.com (http://www.reuters.com)
24. Associated Press, `Rebels Machine Gun Air Force37. Reuters. `Tuareg Rebels Attack Police Post in Northeast Mali'. Reuters, 17 May 2007, www.reuters.com (http://www.reuters.com)
According to a US Air Force spokesman, `the plane was the only U.S. aircraft in the country…' and `had responded to a rare one-time request for help from the government.'
25. Seeking Alpha, `Tuareg Rebels Threaten Uranium Mining in Niger'. Reuters, `Niger22. IRIN. `Niger: Fighting in North but Aid Agencies Hold Firm'. IRIN, June 18 2007, www.irinnews.org (http://www.irinnews.org)
26. VOA News, `Sahara Experts Fear Spread of Niger's Tuareg Rebel Violence'.
27. Landmine Monitor, `Niger: Landmine / ERW26. Keita, Kalifa. May 1998. Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali , Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute.
In 2007 and 2008, land mine explosions in Niger were responsible for killing 46 people and injuring another 139 people.
28. IRIN, `Niger: Rebels29. Les Afriques. `Malian Touareg Rebels, Splintered, Surrender'. Les Afriques, 23 February 2009.
29. IRIN, `Niger: News Filtering out of North'; Internal Displacement10. BBC News. `Tuareg Rebels Raid Mail Army Base'. BBC News, 20 December 2008, www.bbcnews.co.uk/news (http://www.bbcnews.co.uk/news)
30. Al Jazeera, `Niger's32. New York Times, The. `Battle in a Poor Land for Riches Beneath the Soil'. The New York Times, 15 December 2008, www.nytimes.com (http://www.nytimes.com)
31. VOA News, `Cease-Fire Deal Reached'.
32. Amnesty International4. Amnesty International. State of the World's Human Rights – Niger (2008). Amnesty International, 2009, http://archive.amnesty.org/air2008/eng/regions/africa/niger.htm
`At least 16 civilians were reportedly extrajudicially executed by the army and two journalists, both prisoners of conscience, were arrested for their alleged links with the Tuareg armed movement.'
33. Reuters, `Mali Government17. Independent Online. `Niger Defies Critics to Stage Municipal Polls'. Independent Online, 27 December 2009.
34. BBC News, `Tuareg Rebels Raid Mali Army Base'.
35. Agence France-Presse, `Main Tuareg15. Independent Online. `Rebel Chief Says War Only Option'. Independent Online, 25 January 2009, www.iol.co.za (http://www.iol.co.za)
36. Independent Online, `Rebel Chief35. Reuters. `Algerian Militants Ambush Malian Tuaregs, Kill 9'. Reuters, 24 October, 2006, www.reuters.com (http://www.reuters.com)
37. Les Afriques, `Malian Touareg Rebels18. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and the Norwegian Refugee Council. Niger Lull in Conflict Favours Return in North. Geneva: International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 8 September 2009.
38. Reuters, `Niger Group25. Keenan, Jeremy. 2008. Uranium Goes Critical in Niger: Tuareg Rebellions Threaten Sahelian Conflagration. Review of African Political Economy , : 449–66.
39. The surrender of MNJ's Toubou commander, Bocar Mohamed Sougouma, to the government and the creation in May 2008 of the Front of Forces for Rectification (FFR) under the 1990s Tuareg leaders, Rhissa ag Boula and Mohamed Aoutchiki Kriska, reflected early signs of divisions among the Nigerien Tuareg.
40. Independent Online, `Tandja Meets Rebels, Propose Amnesty'. One local analyst believed that Tandja's about-face on negotiations with the rebels was directly tied to `the economic and financial stakes' linked to future foreign development of the country's uranium mining sector. See The New York Times, `Battle in a Poor Land5. Associated Press. `Rebels Machine Gun Air Force C-130'. Associated Press, 14 September 2007.
41. BBC News, `Areva Wins3. American Forces Press Service. `Special Forces Support Pan Sahel Initiative in Africa'. American Forces Press Service, 8, March 2004, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id = 27112 (http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=27112)
Niger Uranium Licence' `Work Begins48. US Government Accounting Office. 31 July 2008. Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership , Washington, DC: GPO. GAO-08-860
on Niger Uranium Mine'.
42. Pipelines International, September 2009, http://pipelinesinternational.com/news/mou_signed_for_trans-sahara/008021/. A memorandum of understanding between Nigeria, Niger, and Algeria was later signed in August 2009; construction of the Nigerien section was estimated to cosft between $400–500 million.
43. Reuters, `Niger's31. New York Times, The. `Niger Sending Troops toward Rebel Area'. The New York Times, 1 July 2007.
Government, Tuareg Rebels Pledge Peace'.
44. Independent Online, `Tandja Meets40. Reuters. `Niger Group Quits Main Tuareg Rebellion Seeks Talks'. Reuters, 11 March 2009, www.reuters.com (http://www.reuters.com)Rebels, Propose Amnesty'.
45. `Gaddafi to Tuareg8. BBC News. `Tuareg Conflict Spreads to Mali'. BBC News, 28 August 2007, www.bbcnews.co.uk/news (http://www.bbcnews.co.uk/news)
"Go Ahead and Enter Niger in Peace"'.
46. Independent Online, `Niger23. IRIN. `Niger: News Filtering out of North Suggests Grave Conditions'. IRIN, 10 December 2007, www.irinnews.org (http://www.irinnews.org)
Defies Critics'.
47. The breakdown is as follows: In Niger some 300 Tuareg fighters and 80 government soldiers were believed to killed, as well as several hundred – the majority civilians – killed or seriously maimed by land mines. The fighting had also displaced 11,000 people, damaged the country's limited infrastructure in the north, and disrupted Niger's critical mining and tourism sectors. In Mali the death toll was much lower with an estimated 50 or so government soldiers killed and an unknown number of rebels dead (probably no more than 100). Several dozen civilians also were killed or injured in land mine explosions and some 1500 people fled the fighting in the north.
48. US House of Representatives46. US Africa Command. Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Fact Sheet, http://www.africom.mil/tsctp.asp
Karl Wycoff: Testimony before the House International Relations Committee. Washington, DC: US House Subcommittee on Africa, 1 April 2004.
49. American Forces Press Service, `Special Forces39. Reuters. Mali Government, Tuareg Agree to Cease-fire Deal, Reuters, 21 July 2008, www.reuters.com (http://www.reuters.com)
Support Pan Sahel Initiative in Africa'.
50. US Department of State52. VOA News. `Cease-Fire Deal Reached Between Mali Government, Tuareg Fighters'. VOA News, 3 April 2008, www.voanews.com (http://www.voanews.com)
`New Counter-Terrorism Initiative to Focus on Saharan Africa'; US Africa51. VOA News. `Sahara Experts Fear Spread of Niger's Tuareg Rebel Violence'. VOA News, 23 August 2007, www.voanews.com (http://www.voanews.com)
Command, Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Fact Sheet. The program has since been renamed the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and Burkina Faso was added in 2009.
51. US Government Accounting Office45. United Nations. Human Development Index, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, GAO-08-860. From October 2005 to October 2008 Niger received $37 million and Mali $31 million of the $229 million spent or obligated by the Department of State, US Agency for International Development, and the Department of Defense under the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative/Partnership.
52. American Forces Press Service, `Special Forces Support Pan Sahel Initiative in Africa'. Comments by US Ambassador Vicki Huddleston.
53. McGregor, `Government Forces Overrun Tuareg Rebel Camps in Northern Mali'.. For example, the government offensive that finally overran the ATNM bases in January 2009 and put ag Bahanga to flight was reportedly led in part by Col. Elhadj Gamou, a Tuareg, from the north.
54. Reuters, `Algerian Militants Ambush Malian Tuaregs, Kill 9'; `Mali Desert16. Independent Online. `Tandja Meets Rebels, Propose Amnesty'. Independent Online, 4 May 2009.
Nomads pledge to battle al Qaeda group'. In October 2006, GSPC/AQIM fighters responded to the killing of one of their deputy commanders in September by launching a revenge attack on Tuareg rebels north of Kidal that left nine rebels dead. In response, an ADC spokesman declared war on the GSPC/AQIM; `we are obligated to attack them' and `we can't negotiate with them… all that is over… we are at war'.
55. US Senate47. US Department of State. New Counter-Terrorism Initiative to Focus on Saharan Africa , Washington, DC: GPO. 17 May 2005
Johnnie Carson: Opening Remarks for Hearing on Counterterrorism in Africa (Sahel Region).
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